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This paper has arisen out of my activities as a consultant to 
the International Organisation of Consumers Unions. In this 
respect the paper also forms an integral part of the issue which 
encompasses products in general of exports of "banned and 
severely restricted products". It would not have been possible 
for me to prepare this contribution without the assistance of a 
large number of people who are committed to combating the 
uncontrolled expert of "dangerous" pharmaceuticals to the Third 
World. 
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I. Introduction 
The export of pharmaceuticals to the countries of the Third 
World is the subject of emotionally-charged argurnents in our 
prosperous industrial society to a greater extent than almost 
any other issue. The industrial countries and the 
pharmaceutical industry established there have sought and are 
still seeking to create the impression that the export of 
pharmaceuticals per se deserves to be promoted and supported 
because it helps to alleviate the yawning deficits in the health 
care sector of the developing countries. On the other side, 
there is mounting criticism of a health philosophy founded on 
the view that the more pharmaceuticals are exported to the Third 
World countries, the sooner the health problems will be 
resolved. · It is not more pharmaceuticals that are required, but 
"essential drugs", which take into account the medicinal needs 
of the developing countries. The European and American 
pharmaceutical industries are vehemently resisting expert 
restrictions and advocate free world trade in pharmaceuticals as 
the best guarantee of optimal health care in the developing 
countries. But despite all the prptests of the pharmaceutical 
industry, the reality of the situation affirms the need for 
regulation. It is not essential, or not solely essential, drugs 
which are exported, but principally a whole host of products 
whose use poses a hazard to the consumers in the developing 
countries, which are simply ineffective or unsuitable, 
unnecessarily overpriced or else formulated in such an 
irrational manner as to rule out any meaningful therapeutic 
applications (1). Every one of these probleru areas would 
justify an in-depth discussion. However, this paper is 
confining itself to the category of "dangerous'' pharmaceuticals. 
In informed circles it is clear what is meant here: the expert 
of pharmaceuticals whose use in the industrial 
restricted or whose marketing or manufacture is 
which nevertheless are exported to the Third 
countries is 
banned, but 
World. This 
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practice goes 
internationally. 
not the supply 
under the heading "double standards" 
The task of this paper is thus defined. It is 
of pharmaceuticals to the Third World or the 
international trade in pharmaceuticals, but solely the expert of 
"dangerous" pharmaceuticals which forms the subject of our 
study. Strictly speaking this constitutes one small facet of a 
vast problem ( 2). And yet the everyday practice of "double 
standards" is a reflection of the overall problem of the supply 
of pharmaceuticals in the Third World. The search for appro-
priate 
broader 
control instruments is conditioned by 
context of pharrnaceutical supplies 
the 
of 
very much 
"essential 
products" to the developing countries ( 3). To this extent the 
development of a plan for regulating exports of dangerous 
pharmaceuticals must be seen as a first attempt to deal with the 
whole problem of pharmaceutical supplies in the countries of the 
Third World. 
II. The Problem of Double Standards 
At international level "double standards" is synonymous with the 
export of "banned and severely restricted products". On closer 
examination the definition of the term "double standards" or 
"banned and severely restricted products" becomes less clear-
cut. For when is a pharmaceutical deerned to be banned and when, 
in the final analysis, is the use of a pharmaceutical "severely 
restricted" ? What we must do first of all is illustrate the 
In so doing, 
International 
Health 
different cases in which "double standards" exist. 
we have taken a large number of studies by the 
Organisation of Consumers Unions (IOCU) and by 
International (HAI) (4) as a basis. Health 
Action 
Action 
International, founded in 1981, today embraces a world-wide 
network of initiatives with the objective of ~utting a stop to 
exports of "dangerous" pharmaceuticals. Significantly, neither 
the pharmaceutical industry nor the World Health Organisation 
nor any other international organisation has conducted studies 
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into the true extent of the problem. The pharmaceutical industry 
plays down the importance of double standards, whilst not 
denying its existence, treating it as an aberration which has 
been repeatedly practised by black sheep in the industry (5). 
The international organisations evidently shy away from 
examining closely such a political hot potato and emotionally-
charged subject. 
1. Categories 
In order to understand the dimensions of the problem of 
dangerous pharmaceuticals exports, it is necessary to briefly 
remind ourselves about the health care situation in the 
countries of the Third World. A key factor is the distinction 
between public health care and private health care (6). The 
comparatively well-developed public health care system suffers 
from the drawback that it can only reach a fraction of the 
c:>oi:iulation. Hospitals are located, as a rule, in the major 
towns, and the rural population must either travel grea~ 
distances into the towns or else try to obtain their drugs 
further without adequate medical advice. This situation is 
exacerbated by the fact that advice by pharmacists is also 
largely lacking. For these reasons pharmaceuticals in the Third 
World countries are sold "over the counter" on a large scale, 
regardless of the type of product or whether it needs to be 
administered under medical supervision. To add to this fragile 
infrastructure, already a problem by itself, "dangerous" 
pharmaceutical supplies are now brought in. 
For perhaps the biggest and most critical problem of drugs 
supplies in the Third World is the circumstances of use (7). 
Already in the "normal case" of pharmaceutical exports which 
coinply with the regulations of the exporting countries in every 
respect, even the most well-intentioned pharmaceutical company 
cannot guarantee that its product will be stored, prescribed, 
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dosed and used in the way reyuired to achieve the optimum 
therapeutic effect. But while the normal case is already 
problematic, and one of the issues in the debate on the 
conditions needed for a properly-functioning health care system 
in the Third World countries, the expert of banned or severely 
restricted pharmaceuticals very quickly enters the twilight zone 
of ruthless entrepreneurial profit-seeking. 
a) Bans and Recalls 
All the industrial countries have differentiated legal machinery 
for prohibiting the further manufacture of dangerous 
pharmaceuticals or for ordering their recall. For the member 
states of the EC the legal regulations are laid down in 
Directives 65/65; 73/319; 75/320 and 83/570 (8). Alongside the 
national rnarketing restrictions there are the schernes of 
voluntary recall by the manufacturers. Since a European 
pharrnaceutical authori ty does not ex ist and even world-wide 
decisions on the banning or recall of a particular 
pharmaceutical are not co-ordinated amongst the countries, 
differences in regulation are bound to emerge when one country 
decides to order a ban or a recall. This produces a domino 
effect both amongst the industrial countries and in their 
relations with the developing countries. Once one country has 
issued a marketing restriction and this decision becomes general 
knowledge, shortly aften1ards other countries follow suit with 
similar or identical decisions. A prerequisite for the domino 
effect is that the industrial countries - for it is they who are 
principally concerned - exchange information about the decisions 
of the national pharmaceutical authorities. It seems that the 
pharmaceutical industry is sorely tempted to exploit this 
difference in regulation. For in such a situation potential 
markets may be opened up both in those industrial countries 
which have not yet got around to introducing regulation, and in 
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the export of t>harmaceuticals to the Third World 
particular subject of this paper. 
- the 
Whereas the decisions by the national pharmaceutical supervisory 
authorities are either intentionally published or at least 
gradually filter out to the public, the voluntary recalls by 
manufacturers and the voluntary recalls "induced" by the state 
remain largely concealed from the public eye. An obligation to 
give notification of recalls or to publish notified recalls does 
not exist either in the European Com~unity or in the United 
States. However, since the national supervisory authorities 
tend to persuade the manuf acturers to apply voluntary 
restrictions themselves before taking official action, this 
creates the opportunity for pharmaceuticals withdrawn 
voluntarily in one country to be dumped, in particular, in Third 
World countries. Such products include: Clioquinol, 
Phenylbutazone, Benoxaprofen, Indoprofen, etc. (9). - The best-
known is certainly Clioquinol, because it has been blamed for 
causing the SMON disease (10). 
Also falling under this category are those products which have 
been approved in the exporting country, but which may no longer 
be sold there. In the Federal Republic of Germany the practice 
seems to have grown up of not withdrawing or even extending the 
approval if the manufacturer guarantees that products recognised 
as dangerous are exported (11). 
b) Severe Restrictions 
This category forms the second plank of the internationally 
conducted debate on ~ossible export controls for dangerous 
pharmaceuticals. Their undefined nature simply invites 
conflicting situations. For it is neither clear which marketing 
restrictions should come under this category nor is it an easy 
matter to find cast-iron criteria for distinguishing between 
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"severe" and "non-severe" restrictions on use. For the 
industrial countries themselves the method of ordering marketing 
restrictions enables them to resµond in a flexible manner to 
hazards arising after the pharmaceutical has been placed on the 
market. The lowest stage of intervention consists in imposing 
restrictions on the indications so that the pharmaceutical may 
only be recomrnended for particular clinical syndromes, or else 
is excluded for use by particular groups of patients (children, 
pregnant women). At the next stage is the possibility of moving 
non-prescription drugs into the category of prescription drugs. 
Marketing restrictions of this kind may be effective in the 
context of a well-developed system of health care in the 
industrial countries, but in the countries of the Third World 
such complex marketing restrictions are definitely not attuned 
to the realities of life over there. For if the alternative is 
"this" drug or "no" drug at all, if medical attention 
guaranteed and if even a well-developed system of sale 
is not 
through 
~harmacies does not exist, there remain only the hospitals which 
may be able to supervise the use of such restricted drugs. It 
is not without good reason that the International Organisation 
of Consumers Unions and Health Action International have 
repeatedly pointed out that prescription drugs can only be put 
to rneaningful use to a 1 imi ted degree ( 12) • They would only 
meet the needs of the developing countries if at the same time 
medical supervision were to be ensured and if it could also be 
guaranteed that the patients were prevented from obtaining 
prescription drugs over the counter- In this respect 
prescription drugs, which cum grano salis come under the 
category of,severe restrictions, are per se a problern group, at 
any rate in the field of private health care (13). 
It is not very helpful to denounce the expert of prescription 
drugs without at the same time working towards the creation of a 
sound infrastructure in the developing countries. Consumer 
Organisations should promote this objective and constantly 
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underline the problems involved in the use of prescription drugs 
in health care. From the point of view of double standards, 
however, marketing restrictions are rnuch easier to deal with in 
the prescription/non-prescription category. 
Restricted indications and partial exclusion of higher risk 
groups should tend to come under the "severely restricted" 
category. Double standards can occur when the drugs 
manufacturer does not indicate the restrictions on use for the 
exported drugs. Since in the industrial countries they are 
obliged to give the restrictions on use in the accompanying 
leaflet - for the EC countries this is laid down in Art. 13 
65/65 (14) - a simple comparison of the leaflets for pharma-
ceuticals on the domestic and export market gives sufficient 
proof of the existence of double standards. In this respect, 
the "severely restricted" category is linked to the labelling of 
pharmaceuticals. For unlike the case of exports of banned, 
withdrawn or unapproved pharmaceuticals, it is not the availa-
bility on the markets of the developing countries which is the 
stumbling block, but rather the availability of the drugs under 
different - and as a rule overpriced ..: conditions. It therefore 
makes sense to deal with the problem of double standards in the 
severely restricted category ih the context of pharmaceutical 
labelling and advertising. 
c) Non-Registration and Non-Approval of Pharmaceuticals 
In the wake of the Thalidomide disaster, the World Health 
Organisation recommended that pharmaceuticals should be subject 
to approval inspections (15). The adoption of EC Directive 
65/65 refers back to the recommendation by the World Health 
Organisation. Leaving aside the in some cases very long delays 
in translating this directive into national legislation, 
pharmaceuticals marketed in the EC member states are now subject 
to approval inspections. By contrast, pharmaceuticals intended 
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I 
only for expert are not subject to the internal national 
approval inspections. These products do not even have to be 
notified under current EC law, so the extent to which unapproved 
pharmaceuticals - because rejected or not even registered - are 
freely circulating in the developing countries is totally 
unknown. Of the different categories of double standards this 
is the most sensitive group. Third World countries have accused 
the pharmaceutical industry of using their citizens as guinea-
pigs for testing new drugs (16). The marketing of Depo-Provera 
is thought to have provoked the biggest reaction in this area 
(17). Depo-Provera is an injected form of contraceptive which 
is intended to provide protection for several months. However, 
at the same time it carries considerable health risks for the 
woman, for which reason its approval was refused in the United 
states. The debate is still raging the world over on whether, 
and under what conditions, Oepo-Provera should be administered 
in the countries of the Third World. The battle-lines of the 
proponents and opponents cut right across the industrial 
countries and the developing countries. For whereas, for 
example, the womens organisations, in industrial countries too, 
are staunchly opposed to the export of Depo-Provera, on the 
other side doctors in the developing countries favour the wide 
use of this contraceptive (18). The reason for their support is 
that the drug requires no permanent medical supervision and 
dispensing of drugs, which in itself, they consider, outweighs 
the higher health risks. 
Although until now only a few cases (19) have come to light, 
there are many indications that the number of unknown cases is 
higher. For the ever-more stringent controls on pharmaceuticals 
has made it increasingly difficult for the pharmaceutical 
industry to obtain approval for a new drug. At the same time, 
however, the pharmaceutical industry needs newly-approved 
products because the large number of expired patents erodes 
their liquidity levels 120). The opportunities which have been 
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opened up in particular to the pharmaceutical industry by 
biotechnology are therefore very much in line with their 
interest in developing new products. So there is a very real 
danger for the developing countries that the pharmaceutical 
industry will divert its attention there and test completely new 
procedures and substances which will only be submitted for 
approval by the domestic pharmaceutical authorities at a very 
much later date. 
d) Advertising and Marketing 
The EC Commission has made several attempts to introduce 
regulations on the advertising and marketing of pharmaceuticals. 
Although these endeavours have not met with any success, a 
number of the member states do have national special rules (21 ). 
Accordingly, there exists an extensive body of customary 
· practice, partly by the authorities and partly by the courts, 
from which it can be inferred what limits are set to advertising 
and marketing measures. Double standards in this sector do not 
relate to the dif ferences in regulation between the industrial 
countries and the developing countries. Rather it is the 
pharmaceutical marketing as a whole which is the object of 
criticism, the legal distinction between advertising and sales 
methods being in this respect of secondary importance. 
The criticism is levelled at the attempts by the pharmaceutical 
industry to awaken a consciousness of the superiority of Western 
pharmaceutical in the developing countries (22). In this way 
the traditionally evolved methods of natural healing are 
supplanted (23) and the consumers in the developing countries 
are driven "into the arms of the pharmaceutical industry". This 
"taste transfer" (24) has, where it succeeds, grave consequences 
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for consumers in t.he developing countries. For rnedicines are 
prohibitively expensive and their high cost means that the 
consumers in those countries of ten f ace the choice of buying 
expensive medicines instead of the needed foodstuffs. Against 
this background it is clear why the International Organisation 
of Consumers Unions as well as Health Action International have 
condemned the pharmaceutical industry for its attempts to sell 
pharmaceuticals as food to the consumers of the Third World 
(25). In the firing line of the criticism are vitamins and 
anabolic steroids (26). Breast-milk substitutes are also 
included in this problem area ( 27). It is a fact that vitamin 
preparations and anabolic steroids form an integral part of the 
prescribing practice of doctors and it is not least for that 
reason that they are consumed in far larger quantities than in 
the industrial countries (28). Since the money would frequently 
be better spent on qualitatively high-value foodstuffs and that 
these are actually very widely available, the question arises as 
to whether the expert of such unsuitable pharmaceuticals 
deserves tobe promoted and is necessary (29). 
Added to this, and here we return again to an essentially more 
concrete level of double Standards, there is the fact that in 
many instances the pharmaceutical industry can be proved to be 
making claims in its advertising to properties for its products 
or suggesting a range of indications which would not stand up to 
the legal provisions applying in the industrial countries by any 
manner of means. Such double standards in advertising relate 
not only to the pharmaceuticals which are supplied as food 
substitutes. Rather it has been established that in actual 
advertising practice the pharmaceutical industry adopts a very 
free-and-easy attitude to information which is necessary and 
laid down in the home country. Restrictions an use are left 
out, contra-indications are not given and references to known 
side effects are "forgotten". A sorry role is played above all. 
by the pharmaceutical industry's advertising of drugs for 
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diarrhoea. We need only mention Lomotil and Chloramphenicol; 
other examples a~e easy to find (30). 
The pharmaceutical industry does 
inf luencing the consciousness of 
not confine 
Third World 
itself to 
consumers 
indirectly by means of advertising urging them to buy drugs. 
One of the most important marketing measures is to exert 
inf luence over the prescribing ~ractice of doctors by the 
extensive use of pharmaceutical representatives (31). Whereas a 
ref)resentative in the Federal Republic of Germany serves 18 
doctors, in the developing countries the figure stands at 1 :4 
(32). Particularly criticised here is the practice of handing 
out free samples of drugs. 
e) Labelling of Pharmaceuticals 
For the member states of the European Community it is not least 
as a result of various directives that it has become a matter of 
course for regulatory measures concerning the use of 
pharmaceuticals to be passed on to the consurner in the 
accompanying leaflets (33). So the consumers in the European 
Community today receive the principal necessary information 
about the dosage of drugs, medical indications, possible side 
effects and, where available, conceivable contra-indications. 
Every measure taken by the pharmaceutical authorities which 
affects the conditions of use requires that the consumer 
information is modified. For the consumers of the Third World 
the situation is fundamentally different. Double standards in 
information on drugs, whether as part of advertising or in the 
accompanying leaflets, are certainly not a universal sales 
strategy of the pharrnaceutical industry. However, in practice, 
the IOCU and HAI have uncovered a whole host of "violations" by 
the pharrnaceutical industry and new ones are constantly coming 
to light (34). It is not surprising. that in their criticism of 
the double standards the IOCU and HAI are focusing on the 
1 
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1 particular area of advertising and labelling of pharmaceuticals. 
°For it is in these areas that double standards are easy to 
prove. Meanwhile, it is difficult to lend credence to the 
~harmaceutical industry's attempts to minimise the problem. Even 
' . when the moti ves of thi? i:>harmaceutical industry are simply 
opportunism rather than profit-seeking (35), nonetheless the 
•question should be asked as to why it is not possible for 
concerns operating internationally to establish uniform 
marketing conditions for their products. 
1
2. Double Standards Strategies 
Just as double standards can be split up into different 
~ategories, it should also be possible to work out 
which are linked to the individual product groups 
strategies 
of double 
standards. This task aj,>pears to. be of such importance because 
it offers a basis for developing appropriate instruments to deal 
with the double standards problem. 
a) Dumping of Stocks 
This rnethod is open to the 
1narketing of a pharrnaceutical 
else a pharmaceutical is 
pharmaceutical industry when the 
is restricted or totally banned or 
recalled by the pharmaceutical 
supervisory authorities because of hazards which have become 
apparent subsequent to their placing on the market. For in 
these cases the industry.runs the risk of being left with large 
stocks on its hands and possibly sustaining financial losses. 
Exports to the Third World, and not only there, offer a 
~suitable" way out. The fact that this is not simply a figment 
cf the consumers organisations' imagination is acknowledged by 
the industry itself (36). For at international level the 
industry has often only declared its willingness to withdraw 
such products after the sale of products in the developing 
~ountries which have been banned in the industrial countries has 
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fully exhausted its earning potential. So long as different 
criteria for assessing health risks exist, this practice will 
continue. The difficulties of the European Community in 
creating a common market for pharmaceuticals illustrate just 
what a long way there is still to gQ before uniform criteria 
have been achieved world-wide. 
b) "Differentiation of Information" 
In theory, the different evaluation criteria for the approval, 
bannirig and recall of pharmaceuticals are reflected in the 
advertisi.ng information and pharmaceutical labelling. In this 
respect there are differences in information, although this is 
not the primary target 'of criticism. Under the heading of 
double. standards, it is the pharmaceutical industry's practice 
of not passing on Information which is fully available in the 
home countries to the consumer in the Third World which is 
condemned. It looks as if the pharmaceutical industry is, in 
particular, exploiting the lack of regulatory powers in the 
Third 11orld countries. The extent to which this happens 
"intentionally" or simply as the conseguence of an "inadvertent 
error" remains to be seen. In practice, this constitutes an 
unfair füarketing measure which could be dealt with by regulation 
at international level. The Breast Milk Substitutes Code (37) 
zaay act as a red rag to the pharrnaceutical industry, but for the 
consumer organisations throughout the world this Code is a 
successful example of international product regulation. 
c) Defence of Double Standards 
The pharmaceutical industry has never attempted to defend the 
differences in the information given in accompanying leaflets or 
in advertising. Such double standards were generally presented 
as exce~tions made in error or due to the independent actions of 
subsidiaries in the Third World and, after exerting appropriate 
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pressure, remedial steps were taken. It is a different matter, 
on the other hand, for the expert of pharmaceuticals whose 
marketing has been banned or which have been recalled in the 
industrial countries. This category also includes 
pharmaceuticals which have not even been subj ected to an 
approval procedure in the industrial countries. All atternpts at 
justification by the pharrnaceutical industry have one thing in 
cornmon: a reference to the different socio-econornic and socio-
cultural 
with the 
conditions in the industrial countries by comparison 
words, the developing countries (38). In other 
impression is given that those pharmaceuticals whose marketing 
has been restricted in the industrial countries could be very 
useful to the developing countries. The pharrnaceutical industry 
knows how to tailor this line of argurnent to the specific 
product being criticised so as to avoid trite over-
simplification. That is not expressed in this way, the 
pharmaceutical industry is careful not to justify dumping 
indiscriminately. Arguments are product related, i.e. linked to 
s;;iecific cases 
indi vidualistic 
rnaking 
in nature. 
them, in the final analysis, 
That is why it is so difficult for 
the opposing side to respond to the justification strategy of 
the pharrnaceutical industry because it can in individual 
instances be appropriate to approve the expert of "dangerous" 
pharrnaceuticals. It could be a task for doctors and pharma-
cologists to list those product groups for which expert could be 
considered under suitably defined conditions. 
d) "Guinea-Pigs" 
The suspicion is there, the accusation is a grave one and since, 
until now, proof has been thin on the ground, those people who 
made the accusation are urged to come forward with the evidence 
to back up their suspicions (39). So long as this has not been 
achieved there should be no talk of a "strategy". This should 
apply even though the indications exist to suggest that the 
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accusation is not totally unjustified. 
3. Dimensions of the Double Standards Problem 
In order to avoid arousing false susceptibilities in this 
sensitive area it must once again be stated quite clearly that 
no def initely-established inforwation exists on the extent to 
which pharmaceuticals are dumped in the Third World (40). The 
International Organisation of Consumers Unions as well as Health 
Action International can do no more than repeatedly point out 
new scandals. In this way it has been possible to pinpoint 
advertising and drugs marking as one of the key areas of double 
standards. The evidence in all the other categories can only be 
furnished by means of individual examples. The share of 
~roducts dumped in this way as a proportion of total 
~harmaceutical exports is not guantifiable. This may change if 
appropriate inspection instruments are found and implemented at 
international level to provide an overall picture of the 
pharmaceuticals actually exported together with their regulatory 
status. On the other hand, the lack of knowledge should not 
provide a pretext for immediately concluding that this is a 
problem worth disregarding. What is needed, rather, is to 
recognise the causes behind the practice of double standards and 
to seek to remedy the situation. 
III. International Regulation of Pharmaceuticals Exports 
Strictly speaking there is no international regulation of 
pharmaceutical exports, or to be more precise, a regulation of 
this kind is, at the most, in the process of emerging. For even 
the l~orld Health Organisation (!mO) as the most irnportant 
international actor is pursuing no special export policy and has 
never done so. In the 40 years since the founding of mlO a 
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whole range of initiatives has been launched with export 
regulation as their objective, but all the time the goalposts 
were moving farther apart (41). It was really only the 
Thalidomide disaster which prompted WHO to perceive 
pharmaceutical supplies as a politico-social problem. The next 
advance took place in the '70s when the supply of 
pharmaceuticals in the Third World had become a problem which 
could no longer be ignored. As a consequence the World Health 
Organisation was compelled to gear its health policy more 
closely to the needs of the Third World. 
The '60s saw above all the attempts to place Third World nations 
in a position to take their own decisions as consumers who have, 
as it were, "reached maturity", by means of an organised 
information exchange (42). The '70s brought a more strongly 
interventionist style of policy, as also in the industrial 
countries. A direct expression of this policy is the Essential 
Drugs Programme (43) and regulation by means of a Code of 
Conduct (44) particularly aimed at combating unfair marketing 
practices by the pharmaceutical industry. At present, in a 
fundamentally different international political situation, in 
which the World Health Organisation has to live with the 
permanent threat by the USA to withdraw its funds, it is a 
matter of consolidating the policy of the '70s, although all too 
often this is thinly-veiled regression. The World Health 
Organisation has lost the momentum of the '70s, and the United 
States has watered down the interventionist elements so that. it 
is scarcely appropriate to talk about a Marketing Code any 
longer. The Third World countries have registered the attempts 
of the industrial states to put a stop to a further 
politicisation of WHO' s health policy and have moved the debate 
on exports of dangerous drugs to the forum of the UN General 
Assembly. Against the fierce resistance only of the United 
States, the famous Resolution 37/137 (45) was adopted, calling 
on the General Secretariat to draw up a Consolidated List of 
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banned and severely restricted products. 
Europe had until then played no part in the international debate 
on the expert of drugs. A laissez-faire policy prevailed into 
the '80s, giving a carte blanche for the expert of drugs to the 
mernber states of the European Community as well as to the EC 
itself. The first move towards a change was made by the Council 
of Europe with its precisely-formulated support, more 
particularly, of the Essential Drugs Programme in 1983 (46). In 
the EC it appears that the way is also being paved towards a 
change in the expert policy pursued until now. This will be at 
the instigation of the European Parliament (47). The magic 
phrase of the day, devised and disseminated by the International 
O.rganisation of Consumers Unions as well as by Health Action 
International is: "Prior Informed Consent". A sideways glance 
at the situation for exports of hazardous waste (48) and 
chemicals ( 49) shows the willingness of the EC to see export 
notification as a generalised instrument of expert regulation. 
In this manner the boundaries are rnarked out within which the 
regulation of drugs exports takes place: information exchange, 
expert notification and expert controls. It is on these three 
cateyories that international attempts to master the problem of 
"dangerous" pharmaceuticals exports have centred. 
1. Exchange of Information 
This covers all steps taken with a view to providing the Third 
World countries with information about pharmaceuticals, which 
they may request if needed. It is therefore assumed that the 
countries of the Third World possess the staff and technical 
resources to make the request, process detailed information and 
translate this into their own product regulations. In actual 
fact, many countries of the Third World have no drugs 
supervisory authority at all, and even where this exists it has 
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few staf f who are also responsible for carrying out many other 
tasks. Finally, the necessary legislation on pharmaceuticals is 
also lacking (50}. In this respect a discussion of the 
information exchange scheme can only be objectively justified if 
it is assumed that the resources necessary for processing the 
information are actually available. 
a) WHO Drug Bulletin and WHO Drug Circular 
With the memory of the Thalidomide disaster still fresh in its 
mind, the General Assembly of the World Health Organisation 
passed Resolution 16.36 (51 ). This resolution was to represent 
a milestone in the development of an information exchange scheme 
(52). It called upon the member states of WHO to notify this 
body of the following decisions taken by their drugs supervisory 
authorities: bans and restrictions on use of pharmaceuticals on 
the r.1arket, refused applica tions for the approval of new pharrna-
ceuticals, and approvals of pharmaceuticals where these impose 
restrictive conditions of use. However, only those decisions 
are covered by the compulsory notification which are taken on 
grounds of serious adverse reactions. At the same time, the 
member states were also asked to state the reasons which had 
prompted them to impose marketing restrictions. In various 
resolutions: 23.48 (53), 28.66 (54) and 37.33 (55), the General 
Assembly affirmed the need for an effective information exchange 
scheme. 
With a view to giving effect to Resolution 16.36, the World 
Health Organisation brought out the Drug Information Circular, 
by means of which decisions notified by the member states can be 
passed on to the Governments. The information contained in the 
circular is not available to the public and is confined to 
Government circles or the competent drugs supervisory 
authorities. Not least in order to ensure that information is 
made publicly available, the lforld Health Organisation 
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supplemented 
reports at 
the Dru9 Circular with the Drug Bulletin, which 
irregular intervals on notified decisions. In 
contrast to the circular, the bulletin does not publish the 
decisions of the national Governments in full, but instead in a 
revised form together with comments. The Drug Bulletin is 
highly-regarded- in the medical profession, although its 
irregular publication is criticised. 
In 1984 the General Secretariat of the UN presented a report to 
the General Assembly on the different information 
schemes of the UN and its agencies (56). The report 
critical of the Drug Information Bulletin and 
Information Circular. Both schemes are, it 
exchange 
is equally 
the Drug 
is true, 
acknowledged to provide to some degree a reasonable and complete 
information service for interested circles, particularly for 
states which do not have a well-developed system of drugs 
inspection. At the same time, they are criticised for the fact 
that the World Health Organisation is only notified of a small 
number of the drugs which are actually withdrawn. The cause of 
this deficiency, according to the report, can be attributed to 
the limited scope of the information exchange scheme. For 
voluntary recalls by the drugs manufacturers are not included in 
the Drug Circular and Drug Bulletin any more than are those 
drugs which, without ever even having been approved, are 
produced solely for export (57). 
b) WHO Certification Scheme (58) 
The primary objective of the certification scheme is to 
establish a mechanism which enables the developing countries to 
be certain that exported drugs are of perfect manufactured 
quality. With the certification scheme the World Health 
Organisation is taking steps to allay the repeated accusations 
by the developing countries that they are being supplied with 
inferior quality drugs. The information exchanged through the 
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certification scheme between the ~exporting and importing 
countries also includes information on the regulatory status of 
the product in the exporting country. 
Already in 1969 the General Assembly of the World Health 
Organisation directed the Secretariat to elaborate a 
certification scheme on the quality of pharmaceuticals in 
international commerce. One year later the General Assembly 
emphatically reaffirmed its concern in Resolution 22.50 (59). 
It was another 5 years before the certif ication scheme was to be 
adopted in Resolution 28.65 (60) in the form which is still in 
effect today. Behind the scenes a dispute immediately broke out 
between the exporting and importing countries on the detailed 
organisation of the certification scheme. In the first place 
WHO put forward a dual certification scheme for discussion (61). 
Under this scheme the competent drugs authority of the exporting 
country would, at the request of an importing country, certify 
that (A) a specific pharmaceutical manufacturer is authorised 
to manufacture and sell the drug in the exporting country, as 
well as to confirm that the pharmaceutical manufacturer's 
company is subject to regular quality inspections; and (B) in 
response to a further request, to inform the importing country 
of the name of the manufacturer of the individual batch, his 
authorisation to manufacture the drug and at the same time to 
confirm that all relevant details about the manufacture and 
tests on the batches have been submitted for examination by the 
drugs supervisory authorities. The exporting countries rejected 
such an organisation of the certification scheme (62). Their 
objections to variant (A) were that the legislation, in any case 
at that time (63), in most of the exporting countries did not 
provide for any quality inspections for exports of certain 
pharmaceuticals. Variant (B) did not meet with approval either. 
This variant would also have required an amendment of the laws 
in the exporting countries. For an inspection of batches of 
pharmaceuticals was and is not compulsory under the national 
laws. 
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The certification scheme introduced in 1975 complies fully with 
the demands of the exporting countries (of the pharmaceutical 
industry). Since then the drugs supervisory authorities are 
only obliged to provide certification·which clearly indicates 
that the sale of the product in the exporting country is 
approved (or if not, the reasons for the ban) and that the 
undertaking in which the product is manufactured is subject to 
regular inspections in accordance with the "Good Manufacturing 
Practices" developed by the World Health Organisation. These 
were adopted by the General Assembly of the World Heal th 
Organisation as far back as 1970. They define a common basis 
for assessing the requirements imposed on the manufacture of 
dru~s. If this information is not enough for the importing 
country it can then require additional particulars from the 
drugs supervisory authorities: which indications, contra-
indications and side-effects are known in the exporting country, 
as well as an inspection analysis of the specific batch for 
export, obtained either from the drugs supervisory authority or 
from the pharrnaceutical manufacturer himself. 
In 1980, 5 years after the introduction of the certification 
scheme, the General Assembly called on the Director-General of 
the World Health Organisation to prepare a report on experiences 
with the scheme (65). The Secretariat ther~upon conducted a 
survey of all the 163 member states of the World Health 
Organisation and also sent a number of consultants to various 
countries with a view to gathering information on the spot about 
the use of the scheme. The results of the survey were 
presented at the Third International Conference of 
Regulatory Authorities (ICDRA) (66). Subsequently 
first 
Drug 
the 
certification scheme has enjoyed growing popularity, 
particularly amongst the developing countries who use it with 
different objectives. For those developing countries who are 
completely dependent on pharmaceutical imports and do not have 
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any kind of infrastructure for drugs inspection this scheme is 
the only source of information. For other countries who are not 
solely dependent on imports and already possess their own 
rudimentary system of inspection, the information serves as a 
first step towards f?rming their own opinions. India and Egypt, 
which themselves manufacture pharmaceuticals on a !arge scale, 
use the certification scherae for their own exports. The major 
industrial countries, on the other hand, particularly in Europe, 
are, it is true, willing in principle to issue certification at 
the request of the importing country, but amongst themselves 
they rely on bilateral or multilateral arrangements. 
The principal users of the scheme, the developing countries, 
have considerable difficulty in putting into practice the scheme 
outlined in model form. This may be due to the highly formal 
style of language. In any case, the survey has brought to light 
the need to formulate directives for the use of the 
certification schemes. These essentially technical difficulties 
should be comparatively easy to resolve. 
Far more serious are the structural deficits which have been 
revealed. Among these is the non-inclusion of raw materials. 
And yet the developing countries, who are in the process of 
building up their own pharmaceutical industries, need 
information about the basic substances from which the finished 
pharmaceutical product is manufactured. The competent 
inspection authorities in the developing countries complain that 
the certification scheme provides no information at all about 
the safety and efficacy of drugs. 
A third criticism concerns the inadequate information about the 
regulatory status of the drug in the exporting country. This 
criticism is hardly svrprising. It was after all foreseeable 
that pharmaceuticals produced solely for expert, and which do 
not have to be either registered or approved in the exporting 
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country, could not be incorporated at all. A structural 
shortcorning of the certification scheme is, furthermore, the 
absence of a mechanism enabling the importing countries to be 
informed about any changes in the regulatory status in the 
exporting country. Since the developing countries as a rule 
require certification for the expert of the first batch, it can 
occur that the information in the certification scheme about the 
regulatory status in the exporting country is totally out-of-
date. The exporting countries discharge their responsibilities 
by notifying the World Health Organisation of any changes, which 
are then passed on in the Drug Circular. A direct exchange of 
information with the inspection authorities in the developing 
countries - who had previously applied for information through 
the certification scheme - does not take place. 
The ICDRA drew up proposals to eliminate the deficiencies 
outlined (67). These proposals were discussed one year later at 
the Conference of Experts on the Rational Use of Drugs" (68). 
There was agreement on the inclusion of information on raw 
materials in the certification scheme, and on the development of 
a mechanism to enable the developing country to obtain 
information about the safety and efficacy of the drug. However, 
it was a different matter for the complex issue of information 
on the regulatory status of the drug in the exporting country. 
The problem was, it is true, discussed more or less in depth, 
but the proposals for a solution remained vague and, above all, 
are not linked up to the information mechanisms 
existence (the Drug Circular and the Consolidated 
will therefore come as no surprise to learn that 
General Assembly of the World Health Organisation, 
in 
in 
already in 
List). It 
1986 the 
connection 
with its "revised strategy on drugs'' (69), called for the scheme 
to be extended to raw materials and product information about 
safety and efficacy, while ignoring the problems of the 
regulatory status of drugs in the exporting country. 
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Nevertheless, the new resolution by the General Assembly is 
important because the inclusion of information about the safety 
and efficacy of drugs opens up possibilities for an upgrading of 
the certification scheme. The Secretariat of the World Health 
Organisation is currently conducting a survey among the member 
countries on just what form a possible change in the 
certif ication scheme could take. Perhaps the most crucial 
question is whether in the opinion of the member state the 
information an the safety and efficacy of a drug should contain 
a summary of the decisive criteria in the approval of the drug. 
The questionnaire refers, for exarnple, to the "Summary Basis of 
Approval" document of the US Food and Drug Administration. But 
it could also equally have referred to the evaluation reports in 
EC Directive 83/570 (70). The prospects for a European 
tiharmaceutical export policy, in the light of the latest 
developments in the World Health Organisation will still require 
our attention. For the time being, any grounds for a possible 
rising euphoria should be nipped in the bud by pointing out that 
the deficiencies diagnosed in 1984 were known about as early as 
1981 and now in 1987 are to be the subject of a feasibility 
study. 
c) EFTA - Pharmaceutical Inspection Convention (71) 
The discussion of the Pharmaceutical Inspection Convention has a 
place here for two reasons: for one thing - whether rightly or 
wrongly remains to be seen - it is regarded as the forerunner of 
the WHO Certification Scheme (72); for another it comes into 
direct competition with the WHO Certification Scheme 
since 1981 non-EFTA members may also participate 
information exchange provided for. 
because 
in the 
The preparatory work of EFTA on the Pharmaceutical Inspection 
Convention was set in motion by the adoption of Directive 65/65 
(73). With this directive the EC embarked upon the difficult 
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task of harmonising the legal provisions on drugs in the member 
states. EFTA then found itself faced with the question as to 
whether it should follow in the footsteps of the EC and also 
seek to remove the technical barriers to trade caused by the 
divergent drugs legislation by harmonising the legal systems. 
The alternative was to leave the existing differences in legis-
lation as they were and instead promote an unimpeded exchange of 
goods based on mutual recognition of drugs supervision. EFTA 
has seen its sceptical attitude confirmed in view of all the 
attempts to achieve a common market in Europe by harmonising 
laws and regulations. For it is a well-known fact that the EC's 
harmonisation plans have come up against sorne rnajor obstacles. 
The thinking which underlies EFTA's Pharmaceutical Inspection 
Convention is that drugs can in any case circulate freely if it 
is ensured that the manufacture of drugs in all countries is 
subject to identical requirements. This has been ·the objective 
of many guidelines on "Basic Standards of Good Uanufacturing 
Practice for Pharrnaceutical Products", which, however, is signi-
ficantly higher in standard than the World Health Organisation's 
"Good Manufacturing Practices" referred to above. Of critical 
importance now is how the irnporting country can be provided with 
a guarantee that the batch awaiting expert has been manufactured 
in accordance with the commonly established _manufacturing 
requirernents. The convention seeks to overcorne this hurdle by 
means of an exchange between the rnernber states of so-called 
"Inspection Reports" (74) drawn up in a standard format. These 
inspection reports always concern a specific pharrnaceutical 
' manufacturer who has been subjected to an inspection as part of 
the activities of the drugs supervisory authorities. The report 
has to give particulars of the purpose of the inspection, the 
sample taken, previous inspections, the persons dealt with, a 
general description of the company (size, integration with other 
companies, situation), staff employed including an outline of 
the company's organisational structure, as well as details about 
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what was actually inspected: the manufacture of tablets, 
packaging, laboratories or warehouses. If the inspection is 
confined to the manufacturing proc.ess, i t should also be 
mentioned that the manufacturer's system of quality control is 
also taken into consideration. 
EFTA has made considerable efforts to standardise these 
inspection reports. And yet the Pharmaceutical Inspection 
Convention can only operate if a climate of mutual trust can be 
created amongst the member countries. Regular meetings of the 
cornpetent persons, training seminars, etc. should be organised 
to this end. A description of the convention would be 
incomplete without a reference to the undertaking entered into 
on all sides to notify each other by the quiekest possible means 
if the inspection brings to light indications that a product 
represents a considerable and grave hazard to the public (75). 
The information to be exchanged covers that which has not yet 
led to regulatory action by the competent drugs supervisory 
authorities. In this respect the exchange of information falls 
below the threshold of the merely formal notification of 
rnarketing restriction measures which have already been adopted. 
For the developing countries the Pharmaceutical Inspection 
Convention has assumed such importance because in 1981 EFTA 
passed a resolution which opened up the system to also include 
countries which are non-EFTA members (76). At their request, 
the competent inspection authorities in the developing countries 
can obtain basic information concerning the drugs inspection. 
It was made clear from the outset that the inspection reports of 
the drugs supervisory authorities would not be placed at the 
disposal of the developing countries. They only receive 
particulars about how long the pharmaceutical manufacturer 
concerned has already been making the product, the range of his 
production, the size of the company, a statement that the 
production is inspected by expert staff whose qualifications 
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satisfy the requirements laid down in national law and, finally, 
a statement that the company is regularly inspected and complies 
with EFTA's "Basic Standards of Good Manufacturing Practice". 
To date it is not known to what extent the developing countries 
have made use of the opening up of the convention. But it seems 
to be over-hasty to write off the Pharmaceutical Inspection 
Convention solely because it places "second-best" information at 
the disposal of the developing countries. For although the 
information does not cover the regulatory status of the drug in 
the exporting country, the statement made does still constitute 
a guarantee that the drug has been manufactured in accordance 
with quality standards which are higher than those of the World 
Health Organisation. In this respect it may be entirely in the 
interests of a deyeloping country to combine the advantages of 
both systems: the WHO Certification Scheme and the 
Pharmaceutical Inspection Convention. 
d) UN Consolidated List (77) 
For the countries of the Third World, the Consolidated List is 
the most important source of information world-wide on banned 
and severely restricted products (chemicals, pesticides, 
pharrnaceuticals and also consumer products). The creation of 
this list was hotly contest~d and its continued existence cannot 
be regarded as beyond doubt. 
When 'the developing countries found that they were not making 
much headway with their efforts within WHO, FAO and UNEP to 
implement stricter export controls or even an export ban for 
"dangerous" products, they shifted the focus of their activities 
to the political forurn of the General Assembly. The objective 
of the developing countries was not primarily to draw up a 
"blacklist'', but rather to prevent or severely restrict the 
export of dangerous products on principle. 
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The developing countries set the ball rolling with the adoption 
of Resolution 35/186 by which the UN Commission on Transnational 
corporations (CTC) was inst~ucted to prepare a report on how to 
deal with the problem of exports of hazardous products. As 
early as 1981 (78) the UN CTC put forward a recommendation for a 
list of banned and restricted products to be drawn up in which 
both the trade names of the products and the manuf acturers 
concerned would be specified. It was just such a politicisation 
of the issue which the industrial countries had feared and which 
had turned them against the assignment of this mandate to the UN 
CTC. For the latter has a reputation for being a political 
department in which mutually sympathetic UN officials, Third 
World countries and Non-Governmental Organisations ( tocu, HAI) 
come together to co-ordinate their policy (79). The industrial 
countries wanted to have the subject dealt with by the technical 
Organisations (WHO, FAO, UNEP) where, in their view, the 
necessary expertise is on hand and which would not seek to find 
a hasty political solution to a scientific and technical 
problem. 
So further developments within the UN hinge upon the 
over whether the problem of exports of "dangerous" 
should be resolved on a scientific and technical 
argument 
products 
or on a 
~olitical level. Nith the adoption of Resolution 37/137 the 
Jeveloping countries achieved the first breakthrough. With the 
backing of the EC countries, but against the vote of the USA, 
the resolution was passed which opened the way for work to start 
on the Consolidated List. To the very end the USA sought to 
Prevent the adoption of the resolution. The USA advanced 
budgetary considerations as a reason, claiming that the drawing 
up of the Consolidated List would incur additional costs - the 
figures ranging between 100 and one million US Dollars. !Vhat 
really lay behind this were fundamental objections to the policy 
associated with a blacklist in which the main manufacturers and 
their trade marks would be named. The countries of the EC 
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probably only voted in favour of the resolution because it 
contains an escape route allowing products to be marketed even 
when they are banned or severely restricted in the home country. 
For the directive permits the expert of such discriminated 
products' even in these cases, as lorig as their consumption in 
the importin~ country is "officially permitted". Since legally 
speaking everything which is not banned is permitted, the 
exporting countries are f ree to expert dangerous products 
provided the importing country has not introduced any 
regulations. The West European exporting countries can 
therefore still claim in such cases that they are acting in 
conformity with Resolution 37/137. 
But the struggle between the disputing parties only really 
started in earnest when it came to preparing the actual list. 
The industrial countries showed their opposition with different 
stances and differing degrees of intensity. The West European 
countries adopted stalling tactics by casting doubt on the need 
for a separate source of information. The existing instruments, 
such as the WHO Certification Scheme and the Drug Circular and 
Drug Bulletin would, in their view, suffice to meet the 
information needs of the developing countries. It took new 
resolutions by the General Assembly and new reports by the 
General Secretary to overturn this objection (80). Once it 
became clear that the UN General Secretariat was firmly rsolved 
to draw up the list, countries such as the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the United Kingdom confined themselves to simply 
giving notification for the category of banned products. As for 
the rest, they said that they required a more precise definition 
of the term "severely restricted" before they could give any 
further information for this category. It was at this point 
that the United States stepped in with its reasons for refusing 
to even participate in preparing the list. In its official 
refusal to the UN Secretariat the USA indulged in considerable 
verbal acrobatics regarding the terms involved and even went as 
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far as to state that banned and severely restricted products did 
not exist as a category in the United States, with the result 
that its own participation was superfluous (81). All that we 
can say here is that these are political categories which are 
certainly in need of interpretation and supplementing. However, 
the legal parrying tactics employed by the USA only poorly 
conceal the obstruction policy which is emerging. The only 
crucial question is whether the industrial countries possess the 
political will to co-operate on the Consolidated List. By doing 
so they will be able to iron out the problems standing in the 
way of a standardisation of the concepts used. The OECD's 
recommendation on the expert of chemicals (82) demonstrates that 
the same countries used identical terminology within this 
organisation, without finding this any hindrance to formuling a 
common expert policy. 
In spite of all this Opposition, in December 1983 the UN 
Secretariat published the first edition of the Consolidated 
List. It was reissued in a slightly revised form in 1984. The 
long-announced second edition of 1986 was made available a 
couple of weeks ago. The 1984 list contains 195 drugs, half of 
which drawn from the WHO Drug Bulletin and the remainder 
supplied by 60 member countries (83). The missing input from 
the USA, as the most important international actor, was not - or 
only marginally - noticeable because the USA and the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA} respectively notify WHO of their 
decisions so that they do make their way into the Consolidated 
List via this roundabout route. The non-governmental 
organisations, finally, who have access to the files of the FDA 
under the Freedom of Information Act, made a further 
contribution to softening the impact of the State Department's 
refusal. Nevertheless, the 1984 list is above all a tribute to 
the commitment of the UN Secretariat, as well as of the UN CTC, 
which endeavoured to track down the trade names and 
manufacturers. However, the latter did not succeed in this aim 
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for the 195 drugs. The member states, even Canada and Sweden, 
declined to give the necessary particulars. The World Health 
Organisation showed only a limited readiness to co-operate. 
Basically it seems that the prevailing view there is that the 
necessary drugs information is in any case accessible from other 
WHO sources; which would however then have to be supplemented by 
additional information to place the marketing restriction in its 
relevant context. 
At any rate, WHO was not prepared to place the Drug Circulars at 
the disposal of the UN Secretariat. In all probability these 
circulars contained information about more than just 100 
products. If in addition one takes into account the industrial 
countries' policy, then the reaction to the published first list 
will not surprise anyone. The developing countries together 
with the non-governmental organisations backed the UN 
Secretariat (84) setting the following priorities: a single !ist 
in the UN system for hazardous products, an inventory of 
regulatory measures, and an inventory of trade names and 
manufacturers; but they refrained from making criticisms so as 
not to jeopardise further work. The industrial states, 
meanwhile, adopted a very different stance, and WHO also took a 
perhaps rather more cautious line: the latter concentrated its 
criticisms on the list's undoubted deficiencies and shortcomings 
(85). For instance, the !ist contains 8 drugs which are simul-
taneously incorporated in the List of Essential Drugs, which 
apparently did not debar them from inclusion in the Consolid.ated 
List. Part of the inforrnation is also obsolete, with generic 
drugs being mentioned which are scarcely to be found on the 
market any more. The Americans would prefer to transform the 
Consolidated List into a simple index with references to data 
available elsewhere in the UN system (86). This would nullify 
the policy objective of the Consolidated List. But the other 
West European exporting countries as well as the technical and 
scientific agencies of the UN - principally WHO and UNEP - also 
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expressed reservations about the incornplete information scheme 
which, it must be added, they have also themselves to answer 
for. 
WHO, UNEP, and the UN (not the UN CTC) had already held a 
meeting in 1985 at which they concluded an interagency agreernent 
(87) which reads like a request list of the industrial states:-
shifting of responsibility away from the UN Secretariat to the 
scientific and technical organisations; - joint editorship by 
WHO, UNEP and UN; - deletion of trade names and manufacturers 
from the list; - removal of drugs which have been withdrawn from 
the market only because of their lack of usefulness; and - clear 
provisions defining the categories "banned and severely 
restricted". Except for the deletion of trade and 
manufacturers' names, all these proposals for amendment have 
found their way into the Secretary-General's report on the first 
experiences with the Consolidated List (83). 
This report formed the basis for the compilation of the second 
fundamentally revised edition of the Consolidated List dating 
from 1986, which has been published in 1987. The list contains 
more than 600 products, of which 253 drugs. It was compiled 
from information from 77 member countries, also including the 
United States. The new allocation of responsibilities within 
the UN organisation led to a tug-of-war behind the scenes 
between the UN Secretariat and WHO over which drugs were to be 
included in the list, and which not. WHO continued to pursue a 
restrictive policy, considering it unwarranted that every known 
decision by a drugs authority should automatically be put on the 
list. Whenever the UN Secretariat discovered that drugs had 
been filtered out in this manner - possibly from other sources -
it sought to use its editing rights to get .them "smuggled back" 
into the list. 
- 34 -
According to the unanimous opinion of all the participants, the 
1986 List is substantially improved. The following are probably 
contributory factors: the henceforward more clear-cut 
criteria for the categories "banned and severely restricted" 
(banned = total ban on sale; severely restricted = restriction 
with regard to particular clinical syndromes or to particular 
groups of people, children, the elderly); - the reference to the 
source of the regulatory measure; - the statement of the reasons 
for the marketing restriction (abridged version of the IVHO Drug 
Bulletin); - and the documentary evidence of risk-free 
administration. As before, the 1986 list contains the trade 
names and _ manufacturers but not :!Pr drugs. The recommend'a tion in 
the Secretary-General's report that the trade names and manufac-
turers names be published in a separate list proved to be a 
boomerang.- For the discriminatory effect which it was intended 
to avoid was in_fact shown up more conspicuously than if they 
had been set out in a single compendium. For this reason, not 
least owing to the intensive lobbying of the non-governmental 
organisations, the trade names and manufacturers' names were 
also incorporated in the list. The UN CTC has taken responsibi-
lity for the compilation. 
For more than half a year the interested circles have been 
waiting fo~ the publication of the 1986 list. A critical factor 
here could have been the financial crisis in the UN (89). The 
continuation of the work is also under threat from another 
quarter~ The office responsible for the list, the Program 
Planning and Co-ordinating Office, may possibly be split up as 
part of the reorganisation within the UN. As a consequence the 
of f ice might lose the necessary personnel for compiling the 
list. 
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2. Export Controls 
Strictly speaking, it is not possible to talk about export 
controls as part of an international regulation of the trade in 
drugs. For NHO is not a supranational body with the authority 
to take regulatory action (90). Nevertheless, in the '70s WHO 
sought to give itself a supranational outlook. This goes back 
to the new orientation in the Norld Health Organisation's policy 
prompted by the growing difficulties surrounding supplies of 
pharmaceuticals in the Third World countries. WHO' s policy on 
drugs was no longer to be founded on purely technical and 
scientific considerations, but rather on a broader socio-
economic embedment of the drugs supply question within the 
overall context of the "New International Economic Order". 
Attempts by the World Health Organisation - backed up in parti-
cular by the developing countries, the majority of whom had 
become members of WHO - to take s tronger action (not to say 
introduce regulation) with regard to the trade in 
pharmaceuticals, brought an actor onto the scene who was to 
cause WHO a great deal-of trouble: the International Federation 
of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations (IFPMA). The 
pharmaceutical· industry mobilised its interests through the 
IFPMA and opposed every effort by the World Health Organisation 
to go beyond simply exchanging information and to actively bring 
about the "right" kind of pharmaceuticals procurement in the 
developing countries. The power of the pharmaceutical industry 
was, it is true, not sufficient to prevent the new formulation 
of policy in the Norld Health Organisation. But, not least 
owing to the active support of the Reagan administration it did 
succeed in taking the edge off the ''interventionist" elements of 
WHO policy in the '70s. 
a) "Essential Drugs" for the Developing Countries 
WHO's Essential Drugs Programme strikes at the nerve centre of 
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the pharmaceutical industry. For it is founded on the view that 
the supply of drugs in the developing countries is adequately 
covered by the provision of between about 200 and 250 drugs. A 
radical reduction in the drugs to between 200 and 250 products, 
primarily generic drugs, would wipe out the Problem of exports 
of banned or severely restricted products. For provided that 
the developing countries kept to this recommendation they would 
only import the products on the list or, where possible, 
manufacture them themselves. 
This change of course in WHO policy was ushered in by Resolution 
28. 66 ( 91) in which the General Assembly underlined the 
necessity of developing a pharmaceuticals policy which catered 
for the heal th needs of the Third World countries. The new 
approach ied in 1977 to the drafting of a prototype list of 
essential drugs, which was published as a technical report 
together wi th recommendations for the necessary accompanying 
information (92). Things did not rest there. Such a list may 
have a _signalling effect, but this in no way guarantees that the 
developing countries will adopt the prototype list as part of 
their own policy. That is why the General Assembly then adopted 
an Action Programme (Resolution 31.32) (93), in which the member 
states (in particular the developing countries) were urged to 
set up the necessary infrastructure (supply, storage, 
distribution) with a view to: making the essential drugs 
available at reasonable prices; - drawing up national prototype 
lists; - as well as creating the necessary regulatory basis for 
supervising the pharmaceuticals market. The General Secretariat 
was called upon, with the help of UNIDO and UNCTAD, to see to it 
that the developing countries do actually receive the drugs or 
else are able to manufacture them themselves. 
The initial reaction of the pharmaceutical industry was 
decidedly negative, even outright hostile. In their view the 
use of the List of Essential Drugs, whether in the form 
- 37 -
recommended by NHO or in a variant form tailored to the needs of 
a developing country, would not improve the supply of drugs in 
the develQping countries, but rather undermine the successes 
already achieved. Sri Lanka (94) and Bangladesh (95) ·were to 
find that the pharmaceutical industry did not stop short at just 
verbal opposition. For when they set about not only drawing up 
a list of essential drugs modelled on the WHO prototype, but 
also radically cutting down the number of drugs available in 
their countries, the pharmaceutical industry gave them an 
ultimatum: either the national lists were extended or al1 
supplies of the essential drugs on the list would be stopped. 
Towards the Norld Health Organisation the pharmaceutical 
industry adopted a more conciliatory a~proach. 3ut only after 
the Norld Health Organisation had decisively limited the 
function of the List of Essential Drugs in an official position 
document. ,\ccording to this the list was assigned a purely 
model character in two senses: firstly in that those countries 
interested in WHO's policy would have to decide for themselves 
whether to take it over as it was or in a modified form; and 
secondly because of the self-evident need to reassess and 
su~plement the NHO list in the light of new medical knowledge. 
In order to demonstrate their readiness to co-operate, the 
pharr.1aceutical industry made a proposal, which in publici ty 
terms was well µrepared, at the General Assembly of the World 
Health Organisation in 1982, to supply the "poor countries" with 
essential drugs on "favourable conditions" {96). For three 
years the norld Health Organisation and the pharmaceutical 
industry negotiated fruitlessly. At any rate partly to blame 
for the failure of the discussions were probably the motives 
behind the offer - which were never expressed in public. In 
reality there was supposed to be a bargain: the supply of (some) 
essential drugs in return for recognition of patent rights and 
trade mark protection { 97) . !lowever, rela tions between the 
World Health Organisation and at least some of the international 
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pharmaceutical enterprises do seem to have eased recently. For 
there is a growing number of reports of successful co-operation 
in implementing the Essential Drugs Programme (98), which cannot 
however be accepted without corroboration. 
The further fate of the programme is unclear. Its long-term 
effect will not least hinge upon whether the World Health 
Organisation publishes the Data Sheets, promised back in 1977, 
and which were supposed to have been prepared for each of the 
drugs on the list. These data sheets are designed along the 
lines of the drugs information leaflets which accompany the 
finished product. They are supposed to provide the prescriber 
(not necessarily a doctor in the developing countries) with all 
the information needed to decid~ 'rl1ether the diagnosed illness 
can be treated with the drug. The Horld Health Organisation has 
been accused of having prepared the data sheets 6 years ago and 
then shelving them rather than release them for publication. 
The World Health Organisation, for its part, stresses the 
difficulty of drawing up standardised information. Health 
Action International has stepped into this vacuum with hProblem 
Drugs". This Action Pack contains up-to-date information on 44 
particularly important but at the same time problematic drugs 
(99). 
As was the case previously, and despite perhaps the most 
ambitious programme which the World Health Organisation has 
elaborated since its foundation, the expert of banned and 
restricted drugs to the developing countries remains a malignant 
problem. Only Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Tanzania have succeeded 
in taking the first steps towards tackling the problem of 
exports of "dangerous products" by using the List of Essential 
Drugs as a guide for their sup~lies of drugs. 
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b) Code of Marketing Practices for the Pharmaceutical Industry 
The very same resolution, namely 31.32, in which the Action 
Programme on Essential Drugs was adopted, called upon the 
General Secretariat of NHO to draw up a Code of Marketing 
Practices-. In view of i ts obj ecti ves, such a code could above 
all contribute towards removing the double standards in 
advertising and labelling of drugs. 
While the criticisms levelled at the Essential Drugs Programme 
may already have been f ierce enough, they pale beside the 
comments of the pharmaceutical industry on WHO's idea of a Code 
of Marketing Practices. According to the industry, the Code has 
been highly stylised as part of a New International Economic 
Order, as an instrumcnt of the social redistribution of wealth 
world wide, and as an expression of the contempt for priiate 
ownership and the incentives which emanate from the profit 
motive in drugs development. Finally, WHO is accused of acting 
as an international authority and thereby overstepping its 
constitutional limits . 
. l\fter WHO had clearly shied away from even attempting to grasp 
the nettle, i.e. to start work on a code, the General Assembly 
issued an ex~ress reminder to WHO in 1982 of the mandate 
assigned to it (100). But it was already too late to implement 
the mandate given in 1978. For the political balance had 
changed, mainly as a conscyuence of the election of Reagan in 
the United States. The USA made it perfectly clear that it 
would not consider supporting NHO and that it favoured the idea 
of a voluntary code for the pharmaceutical industry. Instead of 
reyulation, then, negotiation ( 101) ! For its part, the 
pharmaceutical industry adopted some skilful tactics and took 
advantage of WHO's inactive phase between 1978 and 1982 to 
prepare the International Code of Pharmaceutical Manufacturing 
Practices. When the ;nm Code then came up for renewed 
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discussion in 1982 by the interested developing countries, non-
governmental organisations and the Netherlands, as the only 
industrial state, the IFPMA was able to refer to its Voluntary 
Code and be sure of the agreement not only of the United States. 
It is not least thanks to Health Action International, which had 
itself submitted a comprehensive Draft Code of Pharmaceuticals 
(102) to stimulate the drawing up of a l'IHO Code, that IFP!1A 
found itself compelled to set up a supervisory authority to 
monitor the regulations of the Voluntary Code. However, the 
political i:Jressure was not enough on its own to spur l\1HO into 
action. It was the shockwaves emanating from the adoption of 
the NHO Code on Breast Milk Substitutes (103) which finally 
µrompted WHO to act. Evidently \'IHO did not want to have to 
undergo another such ordeal, or at least not for the second time 
uit~in such a short period. 
At µresent the prospects for the drafting of a Who Code of 
i~rketing Practices are bleak. The only instrument by which 
double standards can be measured is IFP:·IA's Voluntary Code. 
I~CU and Ilealth Action International criticise the fine words 
which conceal the lack of substance, and condemn the absence of 
an independent supervisory authority (104). The pharmaceutical 
industry has had its plans validated and emphasises the positive 
impact on the rnarketing iJractices of the industry. Be that as 
it may, until now no one has taken on the perhaps impossible 
task of examining the Voluntary Code for its ;;>ractical 
significance. One thing only is certain, the double standards 
continue to exist and there has been no obvious change in the 
situation for exports of banned and severely restricted drugs. 
c) US Exports of Unapproved Pharmaceuticals (105) 
Until November of last year the United States of Araerica was the 
only country in the world in uhich the export of unapproved 
drugs was ,,.irohibited without exception. 1.1assive 1)ressure by the 
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US t>har;,1aceutical industry, su,.>.,>orted by Senator Kennedy, has 
led to a chanye in the 50-year old rule. On 14 NoveMber 1986 
President ~eagan signed the Omnibus Health Care Bill (106). 
Under this Bill henceforward the export of drugs, animal 
t>harmaceuticals and biotechnology i.:>roducts to 21 industrial 
countries {the EC countries, Australia, Japan, etc.) is 
.,>errnitted even if permission has only been aj,:>;;>lied for to the 
Food and Drug Administration, but not actually given. Such 
drugs have to be separately labelled "for expert only". The 
expert ban on deliveries to the developing countries does still 
stand, however. The latter will therefore, theoretically at any 
rate, be protected frolil being exploited as a testing ground for 
new dru~s. Even though the US regulation only covers one as;;>ect 
of the double standards t>roblem, it does still deserve to be 
hi~hli';/hted. 
3. ;;:;ci?ort ;·iotification 
The !vorld Health Organisation, it aiust be emphatically repeated, 
has until now not sought to develop s~ecial instruments for 
regulatiny the expert of dan~erous drugs. Its policy, at any 
rate as i t has been formula ted by the General Assembly, was 
diructed durin~ the '70s at securing the supply of drugs to the 
developing countries as a whole. Seen against such a broad 
i?erspective, the expert problem appears as a question of detail 
- not tobe under-estimated it is true -.but still one which has 
been pushed to the periphery of public attention by the 
situation 
conditions 
of 
of 
inadequate 
hygiene 
or poor 
in those 
perspective may change in the future. 
nutrition 
countries 
and dreadful 
(107). This 
Not least because the 
World Health Organisation has had to sustain considerable 
setbacks with its major program:,1es. The Code of Marketing 
Practices can be viewed as an attempt to resolve all the 
Problems of the international trade in drugs at one fell swoop. 
Export notification, meanwhile, represents a special regulation 
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instrument which offers a means to a solution at a much more 
modest but also more detailed level. By comparison with a Who 
Code of Marketing Practices, the export notification instrument 
appears to almost tend to ~ush up exports. For export 
notif ication is not an instrument for regulating market 
practices. It is not intended to exert control over the export 
of banned or severely restricted drugs, but only to define the 
conditions in which export can nevertheless take 
basic thinking behind it is simple and already 
well-known from the consumer protection debate. 
place. The 
sufficiently 
Under this 
system, the developing country is supposed to receive the 
necessary information to be able to build up its own picture of 
the risks posed by the drug in question. The scheme therefore 
relies on the ability of the "mature" importing states to take 
the decision. But since they do not have the necessary 
information to hand it is forwarded to them in the form of 
notification by the exporting country. In the export 
notification model the exchange of information about banned and 
dangerous drugs is linked to the actual expert. If export does 
not take place, the exchange of information is also dropped. 
E;:1Jort notification was developed as an expert policy instrument 
in the United State in the late '70s, not for drugs but for the 
expert of chemicals and pesticides (108). Through the OECD the 
United States have internationalised export notification as an 
instrument of policy action. In fact, at the beginning of the 
'80s the OECD acted as a clearing-house for the divergent 
regulation interests of all the industrial countries concerned. 
The consensus reached is reflected in .the OECD recommendation 
dating from 1984 (109) which is directed at the member States~ 
At the same time it found its way into the FAO Code of Conduct 
on Pesticides (110) and into the UNEP Provisional Notification 
Scheme (111). The critical passayes in each of these regulation 
documents ~re not only identical in content but even in wording, 
apart from a few minimal differences. The developing countries 
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as well as the non-governmental organisations have sought in 
vain to get the concept of Prior Inforrned Consent 
internationally.accepted. In this case the expert of banned and 
severely restricted chemicals and pesticides is only possible if 
the ü1porting countries are informed about the expert prior to 
shipment and on the basis of such information have given their 
express t;)er1aission. The notification model advanced by the OECD 
is far-removed from such a system since it allows notification 
"at the time of the export". The exporting countries are, i t is 
true, urged to give notification of the export prior to shipment 
where possible, but under this model it would be enough for the 
exporting states to simply inform the developing countries 
on a single occasion that the export of dangerous pesticides or 
chemicals of this type has already taken place. Such a 
thorouyhly "lenient" interpretation of the OECD model reduces 
the exf)ort notification to almest nothing more than an exchange 
of information. 
The developiny countries and the non-governmental organisations 
are seeking, now as before, to establish the concept of prior 
informed consent in the course of the werk to revise the FAO 
Code of Conduct (suspended in the autumn of 1987, but possibly 
postponed until 1989) and to revise· the UNEP Notification 
Scheme which was adopted in June 1987 (111a). The latest 
developments in the European Community itself show that the non-
governmental organisations are moving towards also promoting the 
concept of prior informed consent as a means of regulating the 
expert of dangerous drugs. 
IV. Prospects for Export Regulation of Dangerous Pharmaceuticals 
by the EC 
The international balance of forces has altered because since 
the early 1 80s the United States of America has cast off its 
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previous strong claims to the role of moral leadership of the 
industrial countries. This withdrawal has manifested itself in 
a narrower scope for action for WHO, but also for the UN General 
Secretariat. The question is now whether the EC is able and 
willing to step into this vacuum. The opportunity is there to 
come out of the USA's shadow and to take the lead in pursuing an 
export µolicy. The political ground in Europe is already 
prepared. In 1983 the Council of Europe passed Recommendation 
969 (1933) on the Sale of European Pharmaceutical Products in 
the Countries of the Third World ( 112). This recommendation 
calls on the governments.of the member countries to support WHO 
in drafting a Code of Marketing Practices, to step up their 
~articipa tion in the \'ll-10 Certif ica tion Scheme, to stand by the 
developing countries in their efforts to build up a rational and 
econornically-acceptable drugs policy, to help WHO to implernent 
the Essential Drug Action Programme, as well as to subject drugs 
iritended for ex~ort to identical rules to those for domestic 
consumption. The work of the Council of Europe is 
institutionally linked to the harmonisation efforts of the EC to 
create a common market for pharrnaceuticals. For the European 
Pharrnacopoeia has f)rovided the EC with a significant basis upon 
which to build and to which it also refers in Directive 75/313 
(113). Moreover, the Council of Europe, alongside WHO, 
represents the most important international body which deals 
with the regulation of pharmaceuticals. The European Parliament 
has taken up the gauntlet. The Banotti Report and the 
resolution based upon it (114) is the first EC/European document 
concerning the export of pharmaceuticals. The resolution-calls 
for greater co-operation between the EC and lfüO, while no longer 
advocating the necessity of establishiny a WHO Code of Marketing 
Practices. Instead it recornmends that pharrnaceutical exports be 
notified and suggests looking into the possibility of 
instituting an expert ban in particular cases. 
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Objections that the EC could not pursue any expert policy to 
regulate dangerous drugs were overturned by the Commission 
proposal for a "Council Regulation concerning export from and 
import into the Community of certain dangerous chemicals" (115). 
The Commission bases its project on Art. 113 of the EEC Treaty. 
Nowhere in the EEC Treaty is it stated what is to be understood 
by expert policy within the meaning of Art. 113 of the Treaty. 
However, there seems to be a unanimous view that an expert 
policy very probably may formulate restrictions, and does not 
have to be solely guided by economic and trade policy 
considerations (116). Now it could be argued that in so doing 
the EC is in violation of Regulation 2603/69 (117) on the 
establishment of comrnon export rules. 
In the introduction to this regulation it is stated that: 
"Exc>orts from the Comrnunity to third countries (are free), i.e. 
are not subject to any quantitative restrictions". However, any 
re'::(ulation of exports interferes with the "free" export of 
goods. Two arguments show tha t the principles of expert 
regulation cannot have a pre-emptive effect. In the first case 
Art. 11 of the regulation leaves it up to the individual member 
states to introduce expert restrictions for public health 
reasons. In this respect the autonomy enshrined in Art. 36 of 
the EEC Treaty is guaranteed. Secondly, the member states can 
partially relinquish their autonomy and override the purely 
trade oriented expert policy with regulations based on health 
policy considerations. The adoption of the Consumer and 
Environmcntal Protection Programme in the '70s was, after all, 
no more than just that (118). 
More important still than the formal legal disputes over 
competence - which have never yet made an Impression on the 
Commission and the Council - is the absence of a European 
pharmaceuticals authority. Unlike NHO the EC does, it is true, 
have regulatory powers, but it is not, any more than WHO itself, 
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a supranational supervisory authority. In concrete terms this 
means that the Commission has a scope for action in the area of 
pharmaceuticals control only to the extent that· the Council 
confers the appropriate powers upon it through directives or 
regulations. In fact the Commission has only succeeded to a 
limited degree in wresting such powers from the member states. 
To start with there is the information about the activities of 
the national pharmaceuticals inspection authorities, quite apart 
from the Commission's own regulatory powers for the creation of 
a common market. For this reason the EC itself has very little 
information which could serve as a basis for an EC export 
policy. -But the prerequisite of any EC internal market or 
export policy raust be centrally-administered information in the 
hands of the Commission. Strictly speaking, therefore, the 
formulation of an export policy is closely associated with the 
completion of the internal market and, more concretely, an 
extension of the regulatory powers of the Commission. We want 
to confine ourselves to examining the input which the EC can 
rnake towards the international exchange of information in t_he 
tiresent legal situation as well as the form to be taken by, 
where aj,lpropriate, Commission-administered export notification 
or export control for dangerous pharmaceuticals. 
1. Exchange of Information 
There are two avenues open to the EC for obtaining information 
about the regulatory decisions of the supervisory authorities in 
the member states. A third instrument, the rapid information 
system set up in 1984 (119), does not cover pharmaceuticals 
( 120). 
- According. to Art. 33 of Directive 75/319 "(each Member 
state) shall take (121) all the appropriate measures to 
ensure that decisions authorizing marketing, refusing or 
revoking a marketing authorization, cancelling a decision 
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refusing or revoking a marketing authorization, prohibiting 
supply, or withdrawing a product from the market, together 
with the reasons on which such decisions are based, are 
brought to the attention of the Committee (for 
Proprietary Medicinal Products) forthwith," 
- According to Art. 9 and 13 of Directive 65/65, as amended 
by Directive 83/570- (122), the Committee for Proprietary 
Medicinal Products shall receive the following documents, 
in the event that a pharmaceutical manufacturer has made 
use of the Hulti-State Procedure: among the subraitted 
documents the summary of the characteristics of the product 
according to the information given by the manufacturer, and 
the evaluation report drawn u~ by the national supervisory 
authority. The basis for the work of the Committee is 
formed by the manufacturer' s product sumrnary and the 
authority's evaluation report. The Multi-State Procedure 
should facilitate the EC-wide ap~roval of a pharmaceutical 
~roduct which has already. underyone the full inspection 
procedure in one member state. 
Each of these two ave~ues of information has its own particular 
drawbacks. The obligation of notification in Art. 33 is, it is 
true, unlimited, so that the Commission, through the Committee, 
should have a complete overall picture of all the regulatory 
measures of the member states. However, this obligation does 
have a weak point with far-reaching consequences: it does not 
include the very measures which are in practice of re~evance in 
this area. These measures are the tem~orary decisions of the 
authorities and "voluntary recalls'' by the manufacturers, which 
are very often induced by gentle pressure from the authorities. 
In practice, however, i t seems tha t an exchange of in forma tion 
between the national authorities, and including the Commission, 
is actually starting to take place which goes beyond the formal 
limits of Art. 33. There is unanimous agreement about this. In 
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this way the Commission should have to some degree a complete 
overall picture of the content and extent of both the official 
and voluntary marketing restrictions. Only what is actually 
happening remains concealed from the µublic since the exchange 
of information is subject to secrecy. 
The Multi-.State Procedure first came into force in October 1985 
so that any assessment would seem to be premature. However, the 
structural deficits cannot be disregarded. The whole procedure 
is optional, i.e. a pharmaceutical manufacturer may make use of 
the regulation if he anticipates that it would speed up his 
application for drug approval in another EC c~untry. The 
evaluation rei:>orts and product summaries are exchanged between 
the authorities as soon as a pharmaceutical manufacturer has 
initiated the multi-state procedure. The Commission is only 
notified through the committee when the member state applied to 
decides not to give its authorisation or if a member state 
withdraws, suspends, etc. authorisation which it has approved 
previously, even though the product still cantinues to circulate 
unrestrictedly in another member state. This is awkward as far 
the Commission is concerned because both reparts, one from the 
manufacturer's viewpoint and the other from that af the drugs 
approval authorities, sum u~ the results af the analytical, 
toxicolayical and pharmacalogical clinical examination. The 
infarmatian transferred is substantially more specific in nature 
than the mere "indication af graunds" laid down in Art. 33. So 
in the final analysis, the infarmation situation at the 
Commissian depends an how widely the drugs evaluations of the 
member states differ. Only in the case of the recently adopted 
new regulatian an the appraval af biatechnalagy drugs daes the 
praduct summary and evaluatian report have ta be forwarded ta 
the Committee for Praprietary Medicinal Praducts (123). Here, 
far the f irst time, the approval procedure has been centralised 
to same degree. 
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The deficiencies analysed demonstrate the urgent need to develop 
an effective rapid information system for pharmaceuticals (124), 
without which the Commission will be unable either to respond to 
any gaps in regulation within the EC itself, or to make any 
fundamental contribution to the international exchange of 
information. Amony the measures needed here are the formal 
inclusion of voluntary marketing 
notification obligation in Art. 33, 
restrictions in 
but in particular 
the 
the 
unrestricted circulation of the product summaries and evaluation 
reports amongst the competent authorities of the member 
countries- and the Commission. The secrecy problem is awaiting a 
solution. The Commission interprets Art. 214 of the EEC Treaty 
very broadly and in this way has considerably restricted the 
degree of external access to the inforrnation sources. There is 
an urgent need to strike a balance between the public interest 
and the interest of ~rotecting secrecy. This requires a 
fundamental review of what has been the ~ractice until now. 
a) :rno Drug Circular, l'IHO Druc;; Bulletin, UN Consolidated List 
If the EC member states adhere to th~ notification obligations 
entered into with WHO and the UN, the separate input of the EC 
alone would simply double the amount of information already 
available. In actual fact it is likely that the information 
flow will be better in the opposite direction, i.e. the 
Commission may possibly acquire more information, and in more 
detail, through the NHO Bulletin than i t possesses i tself. 
Matters may be otherwise for the products on the Consolidated 
List because some member states (FRG, United Kingdom) are 
pursuing a restrictive notification policy. What exactly the EC 
information situation is, it is not possible to tel!. The EC is 
not formally empowered to store all detailed decisions as data 
and to compile a !ist. The reports of the Comrnittee for 
Proprietary Medicinal Products are still the only source of 
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information. However they are brief and are often published 
after a considerable time lag. 
b) WHO Certification Scheme and Evaluation Reports 
In the short term, perhaps the most interesting possibilities 
for co-o,;>eration reside in the further development of the 
certification scheme. However this is subject to WHO and the EC 
finding a basis for working together in a climate of mutual 
trust. WHO regards the EC as a "Club of Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers" (125), while the EC for its part has considerable 
reservations about the Essential Drugs Action Programme and the 
l'lHO "Code of !-larketing Practices". 
The object of the WHO Certification Scheme is to give a quality 
':iuarantee for ex;:>orted i,Jroducts. The provisions of Chapters IV 
"z.tanufacture" and V "Su.;>ervision" of Directive 75/319 ( 126) are 
1also ap~licable to products intended for export. In this 
res,;>ect the EC defines a universal yuality standard above the 
standards of the !·IHO "Good Manufacturing Practices". It consti-
tutes a violation of current EC law for the member countries to 
.~ ex,)ort dru<;;s which da not satisfy the standards laid down there. 
Even though sanctions mechanisms do not exist, the supply of 
inferior yuality tJroducts would nevertheless be a political 
matter which could daraage the reputation of the pharmaceutical 
industry. However, such cases are seldom made ,;>Ublic because 
the developing countries concerned - even assuming that they 
(can) resister such an occurrence - tend to insist on a substi-
tute or further supply. The pharmaceutical company concerned, 
meanwhile, is likely to only agree to this if it is assured of. 
strict secrecy. 
WHO is currently conductiny a survey to see whether the member 
states are prepared to supplement certification by means of 
accompanying documents on safety and effectiveness (127). In 
the case in point, this would simply co.oprise of the evaluation 
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reports. In the event of a positive response the Commission 
could therefore bring the existence of these evaluation reports 
in the rnember states to the attention of the WHO. Since the 
developing countries generally send their requests under the 
certification scheme to WHO (128) it would be easy for the 
latter to include a reference to the existence of the evaluation 
reports in its reply to the developing countries or to ask the 
exporting countries to hand over the evaluation reports. A 
similar i,:>rocedure could be used for the raanufacturer' s product 
sumrnaries. 
c) Product Summaries and Evaluation Reports as a Basis. for 
Co111piling a European Pharmaceutical Users Handbook 
The Cornmission is largely resting its hopes for creating an 
internal market for pharmaceuticals on the prospects associated 
with the many potential uses of both the newly-acyuired sources 
of inforr.1ation. These are, it is true, to be treated 
confidentially, even if notified to the Committee. But it is 
still a 4uestion of fundamental importance whether this policy 
is sustainable in the lony run. The United States of America do 
not have manifold restrictions on access to data, without this 
having had any known adverse impact on the US pharmaceutical 
industry until now. Publicly accessible product summaries and 
evaluation reports could provide the basis on which to develop a 
European Users Handbook. This handbook would in effect be based 
on officially-checked information and not on information given 
by the pharmaceutical industry. What the Commission is 
considering is modelled on the French VIDAL scheme under which 
checked information is separately labelled. 
For the developing countries such a document, particularly in 
the official EC languages, would be of great value. In this 
project a large number of existing international initiatives 
could be drawn together and channeled into the compilation of an 
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international handbook. WHO could contribute its Data Sheets on 
Essential Drugs and revive the ideas advanced at the time in 
Copenhagen to register "Scientific Evaluation Documents" (129) 
throughout the world. From the point of view of the non-
governmental organisations the handbook would have to be 
measured against the standard of the Action Pack on Problem 
Drugs. Even by modest standards, this could produce the 
companion piece to the International Register of Potentially 
Toxic Che1ilicals (IRPTC). This contains basic information broken 
down into 17 categories concerning the 500 main chemicals (130). 
The scheme is freely accessible to anyone. 
2. Export Notification 
Th~ crucial passage in the resolution of the European Parliament 
is ~uoted below because it seems eminently suitable as a basis 
for discussion ( 131 ) : 
"The Euroi;>ean 
Institutions to 
Parliament calls on 
develop and adopt a 
the Community 
directive to 
ap~roximate the Member States' laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to the expert of 
pharmaceutical products with the intention of prohibiting 
the expert of products which are banned, withdrawn, or 
subject to special restriction within the Community market 
or which have not been registered for that market, unless 
authorities in the importing country specifically 
the ~roduct having f irst been fully informed 
request 
of the 
controls on its use in Europe, and that all notifications 
and resi;>onses by ir11porting countries should be published by 
the Commission~ •.•• 
By taking over such a regulation the Commission would be 
treading new political ground. The pharrnaceutical industry will 
for that reason put up even more vigorous opposition to 
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regulation than the chemical industry, which has been confronted 
with demands for expert notification for years. In reality a 
sense of company identity often exists, although this does_not 
appear to have caused any breach in the industry's ranks. 
However, the different nature of chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
does not provide any grounds for objections to export 
notification. For expert notification has not been discussed 
internationally until now only because the World 9ealth 
Organisation had advocated far tougher intervention measures to 
deal with the double standards problem. The main arguments 
against exi:>0rt notification as such continue to revolve around 
the suitability of the instrument, the definition of its scope 
and what form the procedure would take in practice. The 
opponents of expert notif ication fear a bureaucratisation of the 
phari.1aceutical trade which could qui te easily hamper the 
exchange of goods and yet still not achieve its intended 
objective. The assessraent crit~ria in the industrial countries 
still continue to be so different that it would not be possible 
to find a standard definition for the ti10 key categories of 
banned and severely restricted products. Finally, it is argued, 
prior infor~ed consent as the most highly-developed form of 
export notification would have the effect of hindering trade 
with the developing countries and would be tantamount to an 
expert control. 
Admittedly, export notification results in a bureaucratisation 
of phar;.1aceutical trade wi th the developing countries. This 
would apply all the more if, as the non-go~ernmental 
organisations have been demanding for 
had tobe notified separately (132). 
some time, every shi.,:iment 
Also not to be brushed 
in the processing of aside are the difficulties involved 
detailed information in the developing countries. In many cases 
these countries do not have suff icient personnel and technical 
resources. Preliminary studies of the efficacy of notifications 
are not exactly encouraging ( 133). Most of the notifications 
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sent by the American Environmental Protection Agency get no 
further than the US Embassy of the developing country concerned, 
and are never received at the intended destination, namely the 
competent authority in the importing country. Anyone who, on 
the one hand, stresses the "maturity", or better the own 
responsibility, of the developing countries, ought on the other 
hand to also provide them with the inforrnation which they need 
to make their decisions. Naturally the industrial countries 
only have limi ted powers to remedy the deficiencies in the 
official infrastructure in the developing countries. But from 
these undoubted shortcomings to then draw the conclusion that 
export notification is an unsuitable means for tackling the 
double standards problera, in the case in point, is simply to 
patronise the developing countries. For without information 
from the ·industrial countries the latter are unable to make an 
informed decision on their own responsibility. The mere exchange 
of information, decoupled from the export, does not suffice in 
itself because there is no guarantee that the competent 
authority in the importing country really has the necessary 
infori.1ation to hand. The notification must compensate for the 
organisational and information def iciencies of the developing 
country. In the industrial countries the view that consumer 
information is sufficiently provided for'when it can be obtained 
"on the market" has long been out of date. Likewise, a 
rnechanis•n rteeds to be built into the notification scheme between 
industrial and developing countries which not only provides them 
with the opportunity to obtain the information, but ensures that 
they really are given it in practice. 
Consequently, the atternpts to repudiate prior inforrned consent 
as an instrument of export control are also hardly convincing. 
By providing the developing countries with a procedural 
safeguard, prior inforrned consent should enable them in practice 
to take decisions on their own responsibility. 
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The Opponents of prior informed consent see in the necessary 
approval of the competent authorities in the importing country a 
restriction on the movement of goods because not : only the 
importer but also an authority must decide on whether or not to 
give the go-ahead for the expert. There are two arguments here: 
guaranteeing the sovereignty of the developing country requires 
the involvement of the competent authority in the expert; and on 
the other hand, it is a matter of course for the industrial 
countries that the import of products which are potentially 
harmful to health is subject to state control (134). 
The idea of prior informed consent is a very familiar concept in 
the health sector. For in our legal system the patient must 
';Jive consent for treatment and in some cases a written statement 
is even re~uired. 
Not to be shrugged off, on the other hand, are the difficulties 
involved in a precise formulation of terms. In its first report 
on the assessment of the Consolidated List, the UN showed a way 
which appears to hold considerable promise. Since the disput~s 
over the definition of, in particular, the "severely restricted" 
category are receiving more and more attention, this atternpt at 
a definition is quoted in full below (135) 
Severely restricted: a product containing 
(b) A substance that may be incorporated in pharmaceutical 
dosaye forras only within the specific liraits deterrnined by 
statute; 
(c) A substance that is approved by competent national authority 
subject to restrictions that exclude its use in a 
substantial proportion of the potential taryet population of 
patients. 
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Of course, this definition of terminology does not remove all 
doubt. There is much which remains to be clarified. Without 
pragmatism, however, it will not be possible, even at EC level, 
to fix on a standard notification practice. The UN Secretariat 
has set itself the task of defining the term more precisely in 
the light of detailed information. So in the future it may be 
possible to define for certain groups of drugs and for certain 
indications, those restrictions on use which are deemed to be so 
serious that they should fall under the obligation of 
notification. Finally there is always the reference to the much 
called for own responsibility of the developing countries. The 
latter should be able to decide for themselves whether a 
restriction on sale imposed once constitutes sufficient grounds 
for ~efusing to approve the expert or whether they wish to first 
wait for the opinion-forming process to run its course in a 
number of industrial countries. 
In the· event that a discussion takes place within the Commission 
on whether e;cport notification for pharmaceuticals should be 
introduced, it is to be expected that the proposal for a 
regulation of the "export of certain dangerous cheraicals" will 
be taken as a model. It is therefore worth taking a closer look 
at the,proposal. By this initiative, the EC's aim is to honour 
the international commitments entered into by its member 
countries in the OECD and UNEP (136). In actual fact, the EC's 
regulation proposal goes beyond the consensus reached 
internationally (in the OECD) of the industrial countries. As 
from 1 .1.1989 the principle of "informed choice" is to take 
effect, according to which hazardous chemicals may only be 
exported to those countries which have given their prior consent 
to the iwport (137). However, this would only apply if 
unanimity is achieved on this at international level. At the 
same time the Com1ilission would be assigned the mandate, on 
behalf of the member states, to work with the OECD and UNEP 
towards modifying the export notification arrangements. In 
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practice, this relates to the inclusion of the USA in the 
inforrned choice solution. The developing countries will welcorne 
any imj,)rovement to the notification scherne. 
The criticisrns of the non-governrnental organisations are 
in a position paper by the Coalition Against Dangerous 
(138). In this paper the organisations belonging 
coalition criticise the abandonment of the concept of 
set out 
Exports 
to the 
t:irior 
inforrned consent. For according to the EC proposal, the expert 
would still be possible if the Comrnission had not received any 
corarnunication from the country of destination within 60 days 
front the date of despatch of notification. This provision could 
in the long run lead to an undermining of the actual concept of 
inforraed consent itself. For many developing countries, despite 
good intentions, are not likely to be in a position to take an 
"inforhled" decision in 60 days. The developing countries would 
be faced with the doubtful choice of whether to allow the 
deadline to ~ass without taking any action, or else to consent 
to the ex~ort before the deadline ext:iires even though they have 
not actively taken a decision at all. 
A second point of criticism concerns the scope of the measures 
to be notified. According to the regulation proposal, the 
Comrnission (139) - not the rnember states, it should be noted, 
but the Commission - notifies the country of destination of the 
expert of all the measures set out in the annex ·to the 
regulation proposal. These concern 23 · products which are 
subject to a ban or severe restriction on sale within the 
Coinmunity. The Coalition Against Dangerous Exports is demanding 
that the Commission be ernf>OWered to also notify the develoj,)ing 
countries of those regulatory measures introduced by the member 
states to apl:)ly in their own territory. The reason for this 
deü1and is the j ustified assumption that restrictions on 
marketing at EC level only represent the smallest common 
denorninator and in no way reflect the contradictions in the 
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different assessments of the risks associated with chemicals by 
the member states. This demand may be politically desirable, 
but for the time being it is thwarted by the Commission's lack 
of authority to f)ass on inforr.1ation about the regulatory 
measures of the member states. A European environment authority 
simply does not exist either ! 
The debate on export notification has made yreat strides 
internationally. Quite another guestion is whether the member 
states are prepared to agree to a legally binding regulation. 
The initial discussions on the proposal within the EC have 
dampened the hopes of the developing countries and the non-
yovernmental oryanisations. The "bureaucratisation" of the flow 
of information has met with disaµproval, nor does "prior 
info"rmed choice" seern to have overturned the objections to 
notification. For these reasons it seerns possible that the 
industrial countries will push for the establishment- of the 
compromise neyotiated in the OECD in 1984. The revision of the 
U!-IEP Provisional Notification Scheme in February 1987 has 
confirmed this assumption (140). All the industrial countries, 
exceµt for the Netherlands, defend the OECD/FAQ formula as a 
comi::irOiaise line, beyond which it would currently be difficult to 
attain a reyulation. The Governing Council of UNEP has recently 
opened a new round of neyotiations on Prior Informed Consent. 
Together with the adoption of the notification scheme the 
Governiny Council "requests the Executive Director to convene an 
ad hoc ~orking Group of experts with a view to - (a) 
Developiny procedures of prior informed consent and other 
approaches which could usefully supplement the procedures of the 
London Guidelines (the Notification Scheme); (b) Recoramending 
measures for incorporating the principle of prior informed 
consent in the Guidelines; (c) Reporting on its findinys to the 
next re~ular session of the Governing Council". In any case the 
export notification of drugs can only succeed if the problem of 
severely restricted drugs has been resolved. Efforts will have 
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to be directed towards precisely defining this category. 
3. Export Controls 
Since the European Community can lay down legally binding law 
for its member states, in theory it is free to make the export 
of drugs subject to the issue of a special licence or permit, or 
else to sorne other form of official requirement. A restrictive 
control policy which extends beyond the exchange of information 
and expert notification, was first discussed in the United 
States under President Carter and even brought into effect for a 
short period (141 ). For the EC, until now, only the BEUC and 
IOCU have called for such measures (142). In view of the above 
cor1uaents on the pharrnaceutical indus try' s at ti tude to any kind 
of intervention in exports, it is not hard to imayine how they 
would react to this. The nature and yuality of the arguments 
~ut forward to justify expert controls are therefore of crucial 
i1.1portance. Only when this hurdle has been surrnounted will the 
way be open to think about the mechanisms of an EC control. The 
Buropean Parliament expressly calls upon the Cornmission to do 
just this (143). Lastly, it remains tobe made clear just how 
the EC can help to promote NHO's efforts to introduce controls. 
a) Justification for Export Controls 
The opponents and proponents have been swapping arguments for a 
long time. Each side has adopted its. stance and the positions 
have hardened. Yet it is the exporting pharmaceutical industry 
which stands to gain the most frora the status qua of the 
laissez-faire policy. 
The debate on expert controls has a profoundly moralist slant to 
it. The opponents who, as weil as the pharmaceutical industry, 
until now have included all the industrial states with the 
exception of the Netherlands (144), see expert control as 
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interference in the sovereignty of the developing countries 
( 1 45). No country has the right to force upon another i ts own 
cri teria of assessment for public health and safety. Or, in 
polemical terms, as the author of a newspaper has asked: Can the 
United States be a nanny to the Third World (146) ? Developing 
countries, thus goes the unanimous view, should be able to 
decide for themselves what risks they are to impose on their 
people. The sovereignty argument is backed up with references 
to possible differences of a cultural and socio-economic nature 
which necessitate a different way of looking at health risks. 
Put less diplomatically: the deplorable state of health care in 
the developing countries can justify double standards because 
the cost-benefit analysis is different (147). 
The ·proponents - countries of the Group of 77 (143), as well as 
a nurnber of non-yovernmental organisations, are pursuing a 
legitimation strategy on two levels (149). On the one hand, 
they are ai:1pealing to the moral responsibility of the exporting 
countries and in particular of the pharmaceutical industry. The 
exporting countries, with their high level of scientific and 
technological knowledge, could and should not expose consurners 
in the developing countries to risks which they no longer impose 
on their own citizens. The pharmaceutical industry is damaging 
itself if it exports inferior products since this would tarnish 
its image. On the other hand they point to the irrationality of 
the sovereignty argument. For this assumes first of all that 
the im~orting countries actually have all the personnel and 
technical resources reyuired to be able to take sovereign 
decisions on their own responsibility. Furthermore, the 
industrial countries would have far fewer scruples about 
limiting the sovereignty of the developing countries if possible 
quid pro quo's were involved (such as supply conditions) in 
return for development aid. Socio-cultural differences, 
finally, could lead to a diverqent evaluation in 
individual cases (150), but this does not justify the 
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unrestricted expert of drugs which contravene the standards of 
the manufacturing country. 
Since it cannot be a question of finding out "who is right", it 
is difficult to assess the pros and cons. It would be better 
rather to work on the basis of o~tions. "Partisanship" is made 
difficult because the poorest of the poor, namely the developing 
countries and Africa in particular, participate in the 
international debate - if at all - through their representatives 
in Health Action International. The self-assured developing 
countries, who can perhaps be described collectively as the 
emergent newly-industrialising countries, are inclined to make a 
show of their sovereignty, even though they may not have the 
personnel arn;l technical re·sources to take their own decisions. 
The opponents' argurnent is based on the ideal situation of e~ual 
partner countries. Dehind this assumption can be glimpsed the 
provisions of Article 36 of the EEC Treaty which leaves 
questions of health protection u;;i to the member states. On the 
other hand, the developing countries react with extreme 
sensitivity if they feel they are being patronised. 
The discussion recalls the dispute over the scope and extent of 
consurner protection in numerous prograrnrnes in the industrial 
countries (151). The latter, when they do not support a pure 
laissez-faire 
(152). The 
information 
expert policy, advocate an "information model" 
developing countries should receive the necessary 
to be able to make their own decision. Export 
controls, by contrast, would be the i.)urest form of "paternalist 
consumer protection", designed to take the decisions away from 
the developing countries. Such "socially-cornpensating" (sozial-
kompensatorische) consumer protection - i.e. consumer protection 
which compensates for i;iarticular social conditions - (153) would 
be regarded as justified in the industrial countries in cases 
where the destination countries lack the resources and 
capability to speak for themselves and to look after their own 
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interests. There is a tendency for this approach to be 
transposed to the relations between industrial and developing 
countries. 
place the 
the same 
countries. 
A "socially-compensating" exf>ort control should 
responsibility with the industrial countries but at 
time protect the sovereignty of the- develo,;iing 
Apart from on a moral level, the dispute is principally 
conducted over the ,;iossible impact on international competition. 
Export controls, according to the opponents, would weaken the 
~osition of those countries which have stringent rules, whereas 
exportiny countries with a "more lenient" policy would protect 
their domestic industry. Conversely, the proponents emphasise 
the i,1ossible distortions in cor.1veti tion between the EC 
couhtries, but also in relations between the EC countries and 
the USA. An international expert control policy would avoid 
such distortions in comJ:)etition and define identical ·· standards. 
It seems to me that the discussion on export controls at trade 
~olicy level is being conducted with exaggerated arguments on 
both sides. The United States is probably the only country 
which can lay any claim to having defined an expert policy which 
is reflected in practice in the pharmaceuticals trade with the 
Third Horld. But whether, as Senator ~ennedy asserts, the 
Arnerican pharmaceutical industry is actually· sustaining harm 
because it cannot export unapproved drugs seems to me ~ure 
speculation. After all, there are no obstacles standing in the 
way of the expert of banned, withdrawn or severely restricted 
drugs (154). At the present time there are J:)robably scarcely 
any distortions in competition between the industrial countries. 
The differences in detail are insiynificant. To a greater or 
lesser extent, all the industrial countries - with the possible 
exception of the United States in the matter of the export ban 
on unapproved drugs - are pursuing a laissez-faire policy. If 
one industrial country had actually taken, or were to take a 
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lead in this area, it would considerably facilitate the debate 
on the "moral" level. 
b) Oc>tions for Export Control Regulation 
President Carter's Executive Order of 1981, in addition to the 
export notification of "banned and severely restricted 
products", also made provision for a licensing i_)rocedure for 
"extremely hazardous products" (155). After identification by 
the Department of State and the Departffient of Commerce, these 
products were to be placed on a Commodity Control List. It was 
then the task of the Departrnent of Commerce, after consultation 
with the State Departrnent and the FDA, to decide whether an 
export licence could be issued. The licence was to be issued if 
the Government of the country of destination had raised no 
objections of any kind and the "export would not cause clear and 
si~nificant harm to United States foreign policy interests". 
Since practical ex~eriences could not be gathered, an evaluation 
must be based on the model. A striking feature is the 
cumbersome nature of the procedure, which involved the 
particic>ation of three different bureaucracies. The final 
decision lay with the Dec>artment of Commerce which could only 
refuse the licence it the foreign policy interests were 
threatened with serious harm. If, added to this, it is 
considered 'that only "extrernely hazardous products", and not for 
instance the whole ran~e of "double standards" categories, would 
be subjected to the licensiny ~rocedure, it can be seen that the 
US regulation is substantially more restrictive than it might 
ac>pear at first siyht. Although one of Reagan's first actions 
in office was to revoke the Order (156), the American ai;iµroach 
still stands as the best-conceived instrument - not least 
because of the wide-ranying debate which preceded its adoj:>tion. 
The IOCU and BEUC have outlined a proposal in their position 
~aper on the Banotti Report which goes into the different facets 
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of the opposition to introducing export controls (157). The key 
element of the proposal is the ban in principle on the export of 
banned, unapproved and wi thdrawn drugs, as well as on those 
drugs whose use is restricted in the home country. Exemptions 
should be possible to this ban, for which the pharmaceutical 
rnanufacturer could aJ:)ply for a licence. With this exception-to-
the-rule principle, the IOCU and BEUC want to put an end to the 
double standards problem, while at the same opening the way for 
export in cases where this is proved to meet the needs of the 
developing countries. In order to prevent the exception from 
becorniny the rule, both organisations are calling for an 
objective and transparent licensing procedure. All the parties 
should be involved, also and in particular the developing 
countries. who should be assigned an active role. In concrete 
terms, a i.Jharmaceutical coi.1pany which applies for a licence 
would have to accomtJany its aj,:>plication by information on the 
followin9·: the effectiveness and safety of the drug; the grounds 
for any restriction on marketing; in the case oLan unapproved 
drug: comparable docur.1ents to those for the normal approval; the 
f)ackaging and marking in the form to be used for the expert, as 
well as an outline of the projected advertising measures. The 
information collected, together with any comments by the 
comf)etent export authorities, should then be forwarded to the 
importiny country or to the relevant authorities in that 
country. Once the importing country has given advice of 
receipt, the parties can then enter into negotiations with each 
other. If agreement is reached the licence would be issued. 
The precise conditions for grantiny the licence would be set 
down in writing. 
Placing domestic 
;:iroducts would 
unapproved drugs. 
products on the sarne footing as exported 
not eliminate the problern of exports of 
In this respect the proposal of the IOCU and 
BEUC is not in itself consistent. "hat the pro;:iosal amounts to 
is the taking over of the American regulation. At the same time 
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the problem of double standards in advertising and labelling of 
drugs would no longer apply. For the manufacturers would also 
have to label the products intended for export in accordance 
with Art. 4 of Directive 65/65 (158), i.e. indicating any 
restrictions. 
The ban in principle on exports is considerably more strinyent 
by comparison with the American solution: Nhereas under 
Carter's Order only "extremely hazardous products" were to be 
placed on the blacklist, the BEUC and IOCU want to impose an 
expert ban on all the products in the different categories of 
double standards. Even if such a solution appears to be 
desirable in the lony term, the export control stemming from 
this demand threatens to lead to over-bureaucratisation. The 
USA wanted to avoid this by only subj ecting extrernely hazardous 
products to export controls. The IOCU/BEUC are seeking to deal 
with the problem by means of a strictly regulated exemption 
procedure. But the exemption jJrocedure may perhaps become the 
rule for the very reason that too many drugs tend to come under 
the ban in princi~le on exports. It is therefore worth 
considering whether a general expert ban could not be put into 
the concrete form of a list of all those products for which 
expert would run counter to the needs of the developing 
countries. Nhether such a limitation of the general ban is 
advisable depends very much on whether the plan to compile such 
a list is successful. The preparation of such a list would have 
to include the participation of the Committee for Proprietary 
Medicinal Products, as well as representatives from HHO, the 
developing countries and HAI. In any case, and it is certainly 
thanks to IOCU/3EUC that this had been made clear, the licensing 
procedure must be regulated in a precise manner. However, a 
decisive factor in the issue of the licence should be whether 
the developing countries still want to be suµplied the product 
after the various stages of the procedure have run their course. 
The foreign policy interests of the exporting country are not a 
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decisive factor. 
upheld. 
In this respect the sovereignty principle is 
On purely practical grounds, the question arises as to who 
should administer such a system, the Commission or the member 
states. In the lang term the issuing of a licence should be 
placed .in. EC hands, but such an extension of powers is once 
again bound up with the creation of a European Pharmaceutical 
Authority. But also conceivable would be a rnechanism in which 
the decisions would be co-ordinated with the participation of 
the EC, but without the Commission being responsible for the 
decision itself. 
c) Sup,.iort of WHO Policy 
In theory the EC could stei;> ui;i its efforts to promote the Action 
Pröyrarnme on Essential Drugs. A r.1ajor step forward would be to 
,.ilace the co-ordination of the member countries' various aid 
i:>roy-rarnmes in the hands of the EC ( 159). Co-ordination does not 
mean adr.Jinistration, but does create transparency and possibly 
closer harmonisation as a conseyuence in relations among the EC 
countries, but also between the EC and !VHO. 
The EC is theoretically called upon to support the drawing up of 
a WHO Code of Marketing Practices. For its members had at the 
time taken this decision jointly. If this falls through owiny 
to opposition from the United States, there is still the 
possibility of seeing whether the EC could not draw up a Code of 
Marketing Practices in co-operation with the European 
pharmaceutical industry (160). Such a code should add to but 
not replace the option of expert control. Either way would call 
for a fundamental reorientation for the EC. -The extreme 
slowness in dealing with the WHO Breast Milk Substitute Code, as 
well as its incomplete implementation, in the EC bodies is 
emphatic proof of this (161). 
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V. Conclusions 
Whether it will ever be possible to develop an expert policy in 
the EC is inextricably linked to the completion of the internal 
market. Only when the EC achieves this aim can it obtain the 
necessary powers to conduct an e}~port policy itself. But the 
interdependence of the policies should not lead to a ranking of 
priorities. Export l?Olicy is part of internal market policy and 
can even act as a lever to actually drive it forward. The EC is 
presented with a favourable opportunity to take the lead on the 
international front, and on behalf of the industrial countries, 
to honour the many international obli~ations to a~ply tougher 
controls on the expert of banned and severely restricted 
pharmaceuticals. 
* * * * 
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